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Note
The Right to Have Rights:' Gender Discrimination
in Nationality Laws
Lisa C. Stratton
Natasha Selemo Dow is the daughter of Unity Dow,2 a citi-
zen of B6tswana. 3 Natasha was born in Botswana in 1987 and
has lived there with her parents since birth.4 Natasha is not,
however, a citizen of Botswana under Botswana law.5 Her right
to remain in her country as a legal alien depends upon her abil-
ity to secure residency permits,6 which Botswana grants for no
more than two years.7 Without citizenship, she will not be eli-
gible to vote.8 Her rights to travel are limited.9 She will not be
eligible for government assistance for advanced education.10
Natasha's rights are circumscribed because her father is a
1. The right to a nationality has been equated with the "right to have
rights." Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)
("Citizenship is man's basic right for it is nothing less than the right to have
rights."); see also Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1958) (noting that the
punishment of denationalization violates the Eighth Amendment as the
expatriate is stripped of the right to have rights).
2. Applicant's Founding Affidavit % 8, In re Dow v. Attorney Gen. of
Bots., Case No. Misc. A 124/90 (High Ct. 1991) (Bots.) [hereinafter Applicant's
Affidavit]. I wish to thank Marsha Freeman and Arvonne Fraser, Deputy Di-
rector and Director, respectively, of the International Women's Rights Action
Watch at the University of Minnesota, for making available their information
on Unity Dow's case and their documentation on the Women's Convention.
3. Id. % 4.
4. Id. 87 -9.
5. I. 7 12, 14. See infra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing Bot-
swana's nationality laws).
6. Applicant's Heads of Argument (Oct. 23, 1990) % 11.1, In re Dow v. At-
torney Gen. of Bots., Case No. Misc. A 124/90 (High Ct. 1991) (Bots.) [hereinaf-
ter Applicant's Argument (Oct. 23, 1990)].
7. Id- % 11.3.
8. All citizens 21 years or older are eligible to vote in Botswana. David
R. Stack, The Legal System of Botswana, in 6 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS
CYCLOPEDIA 6.60.1, 6.60.7 n.34. (Kenneth Redden ed., 1990).
9. Applicant's Argument (Oct. 23, 1990), supra note 6, % 11.5.
10. AL, % 11.4.
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foreigner.1 Botswana, like many countries, grants citizenship
by descent, through the citizenship of the parents;' 2 Botswana's
Citizenship Act, however, grants citizenship to children of mar-
ried parents only through the father.13 Thus the children of a
Botswana' 4 woman who marries a citizen of Botswana will be
citizens, while the children of a Botswana woman who marries
a foreigner will have only the citizenship of their father. The
children of a Botswana woman married to a refugee or stateless
person will have no nationality.15 In short, Botswana denies its
female citizens the ability to pass their nationality to their
children.
The legal benefits of nationality are twofold. Domestically,
most nationals gain the benefits of citizenship.' 6 Internation-
ally, the national receives specific protections which interna-
11. Applicant's Affidavit, supra note 2, 7. Her father is a U.S. citizen.
12. Bots. Citizenship (Amendment) Act, No. 17 of 1984, § 2. This is
known as the principle of jus sanguinis. See infra note 21 (explaining distinc-
tion between jus sanguinis, and jus soli, under which nationality is granted
based upon birth within a country's territorial jurisdiction); see also P. WEIS,
NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 95-96 (2d ed. 1979)
(describing distinction between two systems).
13. Botswana's Citizenship (Amendment) Act, No. 17 of 1984, amended
the Citizenship Act of 1982 to grant citizenship at birth only to children whose
fathers are citizens at the time of the child's birth and children born out of
wedlock to a mother who is a citizen of Botswana. Bots. Citizenship (Amend-
ment) Act, No. 17 of 1984, § 2. The Citizenship Act of 1982 had granted citi-
zenship at birth to all children born in Botswana unless the child acquired the
citizenship of another country by descent through the father. Bots. Citizen-
ship Act, No. 25, 1982, § 4(1). Thus a Botswana woman married to an alien
cannot confer her nationality on her children, while a Botswana man married
to an alien woman may confer his citizenship.
14. A citizen of Botswana is a Botswana, citizens are Batswana. Stack,
supra note 8, at 6.60.5 n.7.
15. Thus, for example, the children of a Botswana citizen married to a
South African refugee would be stateless. They would only be able to travel
on United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees passports, and would not
enjoy the protection of any government. Keto Segwai, More Women Chal-
lenge Citizenship Act, THE REPORTER (Bots.), Aug. 17-23, 1991, at 1.
16. Although the terms "nationality" and "citizenship" are often used in-
terchangeably, the two concepts are not always synonymous. While all citizens
are nationals of a State, not all nationals are citizens. WEIS, supra note 12, at
5-6 (also noting that a few States create different categories of citizenship for
their nationals). "Nationality" is often defined as the characterization a state
makes of an individual for the purpose of controlling and protecting that indi-
vidual. MYREs S. McDoUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIc OR-
DER 737-38 (1980). Accordingly, nationality is a reciprocal relationship
entitling one to the rights, and subjecting one to the burdens, of citizenship.
WEIS, supra note 12, at 239.
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tional law requires the State to provide.17 Although the
international benefits of nationality have received the most at-
tention from the community of nations,'8 the domestic benefits
of citizenship derived from nationality have tremendous impor-
tance in the daily lives of individuals in every State.19 These
benefits may include the rights to vote, to hold public office, to
public education, to permanent residency, to own land, to
travel, and eligibility for employment.20
Laws concerning the acquisition, retention and deprivation
of nationality traditionally have been considered a sovereign
function of the State under international law.21 That domestic
17. A State's most basic duty is to admit nationals to the state's territory.
See H.F. VAN PANHUYS, THE ROLE OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 56
(1959) ('The duty to admit nationals is considered so important a consequence
of nationality that it is almost equated with it."). The right of the national to
reside within the State's territory is a natural consequence of this duty. WEIS,
supra note 12, at 45, 239-241. A United Nations survey of international instru-
ments and national laws concluded that the right to leave and return is "a
legal obligation according to customary international law." C. Mubanga-Chi-
poya, Analysis of the Current Trends and Developments Regarding the Right
to Leave any Country Including One's Own, and to Return to One's Own
Country, and Some Other Rights or Consideration Arising Therefrom, at 11,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/10, quoted in THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND HUMANITARIAN NORMs As CUSTOMARY LAw 97 n.46 (1989). The national
also gains from his or her state the benefit of diplomatic protection. See WEIS,
supra note 12, at 32-33.
18. Emphasis on the international aspects of nationality stems from the
fact that nations have mutual sovereign interests in clarifying the status of na-
tionality laws in international law. Thus international treaties have addressed
conflicts between States arising from dual nationality and the obligations of a
State toward stateless persons within its jurisdiction. See, e.g., Convention on
the Reduction of Statelessness, GA. Res. 896, U.N. ESCOR, 17th Sess., Supp.
No.1, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 9/15 (1954), 360 U.N.T.S. 117, (entered into force
March 28, 1968), reprinted in CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, UNITED NATIONS,
HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS at 273-81,
U.N. Doe. ST/HR/1/Rev.3, U.N. Sales No. E.88IV.1 (1988) [hereinafter IN-
TERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS]. Recognizing the importance of the right to a na-
tionality, the United Nations has addressed the problem of statelessness, the
legal status resulting from the lack of a nationality. See, e.g., Convention Re-
lating to the Status of Stateless Persons, E.S.C. Res. 526A (XVII), U.N. ES-
COR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 1 (1954), 360 U.N.T.S. 130, (entered into force June
6, 1960), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra, at 282-94.
19. See supra text accompanying notes 6-10 (detailing the domestic effects
of the discriminatory denial of a nationality). The domestic aspect of national-
ity is not confined to tangible governmental benefits. One scholar of interna-
tional law describes nationality as "an essential legal attribute of human
personality." H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND HUMAN RIGHTS 348
(1950).
20. MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 16, at 921-22 (discussing the harm re-
sulting from the lack of a nationality).
21. The Permanent Court of International Justice, the precursor to the
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laws define the acquisition and loss of nationality does not,
however, preclude regulation by international law.22 Obliga-
tions under both customary international law and multilateral
treaties.limit the ability of States to grant or deny individuals
nationality.23
The development of international human rights law has
eroded the traditional view that nationality laws are solely
within the purview of sovereign States.2 Historically, only
International Court of Justice, set forth the traditional view of state sover-
eignty over nationality in 1923. Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees, 1923
P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at 24 (Feb. 7). Although the Court appeared to contra-
dict itself by ultimately finding that the Decrees issued in Tunis and Morocco
and their application to British subjects were by international law not solely a
matter of domestic jurisdiction, the Court did so on the exclusive facts of the
case. WEIS, supra note 12, at 73. Domestic law thus determines how and
under what conditions one becomes a national of a State. I& at 3-9; see also
Johannes M. M. Chan, The Right to a Nationality as a Human Right, 12 Hum.
RTS. L.J. 1, 1 (1991) (noting that States guard their control over nationality
closely). Nationality laws are often part of individual States' constitutions.
WEIS, supra note 12, at 45 (providing examples).
There are two legal theories regarding the original acquisition of national-
ity. Countries following the jus soli theory view nationality as derived from a
territorial relationship and thus recognize the acquisition of nationality by
birth within their territorial jurisdiction. Id at 95. Those countries recogniz-
ing thejus sanguinis theory grant nationality only by descent. Id. Some coun-
tries use aspects of both approaches in their nationalities laws. Id at 95-96
(noting increase in mixed systems). See generally DAVID WEISSBRODT, IMMI-
GRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL § 12-1.2 (3d ed. 1992) (summa-
rizing historical development of the two systems). Some scholars of
international law define nationality as a reciprocal relationship of rights and
obligations between an individual and a State. Id. Other scholars conceive of
nationality as a legal status which leads to rights and obligations as a conse-
quence of possession of the status. VAN PANHUYS, supra note 17, at 20. See
generally WEIS, supra note 12, at 29-32.
22. WFs, supra note 12, at 240.
23. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice deline-
ates three generally accepted sources of international law: "international con-
ventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by contesting states; international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law; [and] the general principles of law recognized by civi-
lized nations." Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1031, art.
38 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945), reprinted in FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID
WEISsBRODT, SELECTED INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS at 9-11
(1990) [hereinafter SELECTED INSTRUMENTS]. See generally THOMAS Bu-
ERGENTHAL & HAROLD G. MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL
19-34 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing the sources of international law).
24. See, e.g., Chan, supra note 21, at 1 (noting that 60 years after the 1923
Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees decision of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights recognized
that nationality is an inherent right of all human beings). Chan notes a "clear
trend towards a gradual recognition of an individual's right to a nationality,"
attributable to the many international instruments protecting fundamental
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States, not individuals, were subjects of international law.2s
Nationality provided the individual with a legal relationship to
a State and therefore with a link to international law.2 6 Today,
however, multilateral human rights treaties limit the ability of
sovereign states to circumscribe individual rights,27 thus mak-
human rights irrespective of nationality, to national legislation, and to custom-
ary international law protecting civil and political rights. L at 13. Chan also
notes a global consensus on the undesirability of statelessness due to states'
recognition that any international effort to eliminate statelessness must en-
croach on state sovereignty over nationality laws. Id.; see also WEIS, supra
note 12, at 256 (noting that the enactment of the United Nations Charter sig-
nalled that human rights were no longer exclusively a matter of domestic con-
cern, and that further development of international law on nationality is
linked with the development of the position of the individual in international
law). The Inter-American Court of Human Rights further described this de-
velopment in an Advisory Opinion concerning proposed amendments to the
nationality provisions of the Costa Rican constitution. Advisory Opinion No.
OC-4/84, Amendments to the naturalization provisions of the Constitution of
Costa Rica, 1984 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 32 (Jan. 19), re-
printed in 5 HuM. RTS. L.J. 161-67 (1984) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion on
Costa Rica's Naturalization Provisions] (international human rights law im-
poses limits on a state's jurisdiction over the conferral and regulation of
nationality).
25. Nationality served as the basis on which a State gained standing to
protect its national's interests in international affairs. Chan, supra note 21, at
1. But the state retained absolute sovereignty over granting nationality status.
Id.
26. WEis, supra note 12, at 29. Prior to the 20th century development of
protections for individual human rights, individuals were simply objects of in-
ternational law. GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 235 (1992). In
his 1950 proposal for an International Bill of the Rights of Man, Professor
Lauterpacht noted that the importance of a right to a nationality is predicated
on "the existence of sovereign states claiming to be the indispensable link be-
tween the individual and international law." LAUTERPACHT, supra note 19, at
347. Thus he proposed a right to the nationality of the State of birth. 1d. at
346.
27. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion No. OC-2/82, Entry into Force of the
American Convention for a State Ratifying or Adhering with a Reservation,
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, % 29 (Sept. 24), reprinted in 3 HuM.
RTS. L.J. 152, 162 (1982) (noting that human rights treaties impose various ob-
ligations on States "not in relation to other States, but towards all individuals
within their jurisdictions"); see also Rosalyn Higgins, The European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, in 2 HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL
AND PoLicY IssuEs 495, 538 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984) (noting the importance
for an individual to be able to bring a claim as a human rights law claim is that
human rights law, unlike classical international law, imposes obligations upon
states regarding their treatment of nationals and non-nationals alike, and pro-
vides individuals with the procedural capacity to defend their rights). While
under contemporary international law individuals have greater protections
due to a legal framework embodying inalienable human rights which States
may not violate regardless of an individual's nationality, the domestic benefits
of nationality also underlie the need for protecting the right to a nationality in
1992]
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ing the individual a subject of international law.28 A number of
these treaties protect the individual's right to acquire, retain,
change, or confer one's nationality, thus limiting state sover-
eignty over nationality laws.2
International human rights law also recognizes a norm of
non-discrimination on the basis of sex, further limiting state
sovereignty over nationality laws.30 The preamble and two arti-
human rights treaties. See supra notes 6-10, 19 (discussing domestic benefits of
nationality).
In drafting an International Bill of the Rights of Man, Professor Lauter-
pacht explained that despite the fact that human rights treaties require states
to act regardless of the nationality of the individual, the problems associated
with statelessness still require that the right to a nationality must be included
in any Bill of Rights. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 19, at 347-48.
28. As a "subject" of international law, an individual has international
rights and duties, and may bring international claims. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCI-
PLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 58-60 (4th ed. 1990). See generally VoN
GLAHN, supra note 26, at 235-51 (discussing the evolving status of individuals
under international law); Louis Sohn, The New International Law: Protection
of the Rights of the Individual Rather Than States, 32 Am. U. L. REV. 1 (1982).
29. The Preamble to the United Nations Charter commits the organiza-
tion to good faith in fundamental human rights. This commitment is also
found in Article 55 which states that "the United Nations shall promote: uni-
versal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." U.N. CHAP-
TER art. 55, c. Furthermore, Article 56 creates an affirmative obligation on
member States to "take joint and separate action" for the achievement of the
purposes set forth in Article 55. U.N. CHARTER art. 56.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the authoritative interpre-
tation of the obligation to protect human rights embodied in the United Na-
tions Charter. Article 15 of the Universal Declaration not only provides that
"[e]veryone has the right to a nationality," but also protects the right to retain
it, and the right to change it voluntarily. G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. Doc.
A/810, art. 15 (1948), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note
18, at 1-7.
Other general human rights treaties containing provisions relating to the
right to a nationality include the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, art. 24(3),
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, (entered into force March 23, 1976)
[hereinafter International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], reprinted
in INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 18, at 18-38; the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res.
34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, art. 9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180,
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter Women's Convention], reprinted
in INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 18, at 112-125; the American Con-
vention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, at 1,
OEA/Ser. L./V/II.23 doc. rev. 2, art. 20 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [here-
inafter American Convention], reprinted in SELECTED INSTRUMENTS, supra
note 23, at 61-83.
30. Women's rights are specifically addressed in, for example, the U.N.
CHARTER art. 55, c.; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
supra note 29, art. 4, 1; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
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cles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights set forth the
right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of sex.31 De-
spite this nearly universally accepted statement and similar
anti-discrimination provisions in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the United Nations Com-
mission on the Status of Women concluded in 1974 that contin-
uing de facto discrimination against women around the world
warranted drafting a separate treaty to demonstrate the inter-
national community's commitment to eliminating all forms of
Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16,
art. 2, q 2, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, (entered into force January
3, 1976), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 18, at 7-18; the
American Convention, supra note 29, art. 1; the [European] Convention For
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 222, (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), as amended by Protocol No. 3,
(entered into force Sept. 21, 1970), and Protocol No. 5, (entered into force Dec.
21, 1971) [hereinafter European Convention], reprinted in SELECTED INSTRU-
MENTs, supra note 23, at 97-110; the African [BanJul] Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58
(1982), (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter African Charter], ex-
cerpts reprinted in SELECTED INsmuMENTs, supra note 23, at 52-61; the Con-
vention on the Political Rights of Women, G.A. Res. 640 (VII), U.N. GAOR,
7th Seass., Supp. No. 20, at 27, 193 U.N.T.S. 135, (entered into force July 7,
1954), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 18, at 358-360;
the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, U.N. ESCO, 11th Sess.,
(1960), 429 U.N.T.S. 93, (entered into force May 22, 1962), reprinted in INTER-
NATIONL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 18, at 88-95; the Convention on the Na-
tionality of Married Women, G.A. Res. 1040, U.N. GAOR, 11th Seass., Supp. No.
17, at 18, (1957), 309 U.N.T.S. 65, (entered into force August 11, 1958), re-
printed in INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 18, at 269-73; the Conven-
tion on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of
Marriages, G.A. Res. 1763A (XVII), U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17,
(1962), (entered into force Dec. 9, 1964), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL INSTaU-
MENTS, supra note 18, at 361-64; and the Convention for the Suppression of the
Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, G.A. Res.
317, U.N. Doec A/1164 (1949), 96 U.N.T.S. 271, (entered into force July 25, 1951),
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 18, at 181-89. See gen-
erally Renee Holt, Women's Rights: An International Perspective, in WOMEN
AND T LAw § 17.02[2] (Carol H. Lefcourt ed., 1990) (listing international
agreements addressing women's rights). The Women's Convention, supra note
29, is the most comprehensive international legal instrument protecting wo-
men's rights and status. For a comprehensive bibliography on sex discrimina-
tion in international law, see Rebecca J. Cook, Women's International Human
Rights: A Bibliography, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 857 (1992).
31. Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that
"Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declara-
tion, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, reli-
gion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 29, art. 2,
1; see also id. pmbl., art. 7.
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sex discrimination.3 2
The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women (Women's Convention) contains
the most explicit and comprehensive prohibition of sex-based
discrimination in nationality laws of any multilateral human
rights treaty. It provides for full equality with men in all cir-
cumstances 33 and expressly mandates equality with men with
respect to the nationality of any children.34 The Women's Con-
vention entered into force in September 1981 and as of July 31,
1992 has 116 State Parties.35
Despite these prohibitions on gender discrimination in na-
tionality laws, women in many countries, some of which are
parties to the treaties, face continuing discrimination.
Although nationality laws vary considerably from country to
country,36 discrimination on the basis of sex generally takes one
32. Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 643, 665
(1990).
33. The Women's Convention contains both a definition of discrimination,
Women's Convention, supra note 29, pt. 1, art. 1, and a requirement that States
Parties undertake affirmative measures to eradicate that discrimination. Id.
pt. 1, art. 2. It contains provisions regarding sex roles and stereotyping, prosti-
tution, political and public life, participation at the international level, nation-
ality, equal rights in education, employment, health care and family planning,
economic and social benefits, rural women, equality before the law, and mar-
riage and family law. Ia pts. 1-4.
34. Article 9 requires that:
1. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men to ac-
quire, change or retain their nationality. They shall ensure in particu-
lar that neither marriage to an alien nor change of nationality by the
husband during marriage shall automatically change the nationality
of the wife, render her stateless or force upon her the nationality of
the husband.
2. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men with re-
spect to the nationality of their children.
Women's Convention, supra note 29, art. 9.
35. MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPosITED WrrH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL:
STATUS AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1991, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/Ser.E/10, at 169, U.N.
Sales No. E.92.V.4 (1991) [hereinafter MULTILATERAL TREATIES] (110 parties as
of December 31, 1991); see also Interview with Marsha Freeman, Deputy Di-
rector, International Women's Rights Action Watch (July 29, 1992) (noting
that the most recent countries to ratify were Slovenia and Jordan) (citing In-
geborg Creydt, Division for the Advancement for Women of the United Na-
tions). Jordan, however, reserved Article 9(2) concerning equality with regard
to the nationality of children of a marriage. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra,
at 173 (noting reservation upon signing). See infra note 53 (explaining
reservations).
36. No current publication compiles domestic nationality laws. One sur-
vey of nationality laws was published in 1929. A COLLECTION OF NATIONALITY
LAWS OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES, (Richard W. Flourney, Jr. & Manley 0. Hudson
[Vol. 77:195
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of several forms. First, a woman may face deprivation of her
nationality upon marriage to a foreigner or a change in her hus-
band's nationality.37 Second, although states frequently make
eds., 1929). The United Nations published several compilations of domestic na-
tionality provisions in the 1950's. TiE PROBLEMS OF STATELESSNESS: CONSOLI-
DATED REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COUNCIL, U.N. ESCOR, 14th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/2230/A/CN.4/56 (1952); U.N.
LEGAL DEP'T, LAWS CONCERNING NATIONALITY, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/Ser.B/4,
Sales No. 1954.V.1. (1954); U.N. LEGAL DEP'T, SUPPLEMENT TO THE VOLUME ON
LAws CONCERNING NATIONALITY, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/Ser. B/9, U.N. Sales No.
59.V.3 (1954). See generally U.N. DEPT. OF ECON. AND Soc. AFFAIRS, CONVEN-
TION ON THE NATIONALITY OF MARRIED WOMEN: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
AND COMMENTARY at 3-24, U.N. Doe. E/CN.6/389, U.N. Sales No. 62. IV. 3
(1962) [hereinafter HISTORICAL BACKGROUND] (providing a brief history of the
development of the concept of equality for women, particularly married wo-
men, in nationality laws).
In 1962, the Economic and Social Council published both a history of the
development of the concept of equality for married women in nationality laws
culminating in the adoption of the Convention on the Nationality of Married
Women, i., and a study compiling and categorizing the nationality laws of 106
countries, U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. AND Soc. AFFAIRS, NATIONALITY OF MARRIED
WOMEN: REPORT OF SECRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/254/Rev. 1, U.N.
Sales No. 64.V.1 (1963). The annex to Nationality of Married Women con-
tains a chart showing the legal effect of marriage on the nationality of women
in each surveyed country, while the body of the report reproduces the consti-
tutions, laws, and other legal instruments relating to nationality of each coun-
try. Id. at 122.
The best source of current information regarding states' nationality provi-
sions as they relate to women is the reports submitted by States Parties to
CEDAW, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Wo-
men, which is charged with implementing the Women's Convention. See infra
note 90 for a description of the reporting process.
This writer has reviewed every report submitted by States Parties to the
Women's Convention as of July 31, 1992. The following countries have indi-
cated that their nationality laws continue to discriminate against women: the
Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ghana, Iraq, Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Nige-
ria, the Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Yemen,
and the United Kingdom. See infra Appendix (providing summaries of
Reports).
37. Until 1910, a wife automatically took her husband's nationality under
almost all countries' laws, with the exception of some South American nations.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, supra note 36, at 3. During the decades between
1910 and 1930, at least twenty countries changed their laws to grant greater
independence to women; by 1930, however, most countries continued to re-
quire that a woman's nationality follow that of her husband. Id. at 3-4, 5. The
first reforms of domestic laws often entailed the addition of a condition provid-
ing that a woman would lose her nationality upon marriage only if she ac-
quired her husband's nationality. Id. at 6. Previously, a woman's own state
might have withdrawn her nationality upon her marriage even though her
husband's state did not grant her his nationality. See id. at 4. The reform pre-
vented women from being rendered stateless by marriage. Another reform re-
quired a woman's consent before any change in her nationality could result
from her marriage. 1d. at 7. In 1922, the United States passed the Naturaliza-
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special provisions for the naturalization of foreign spouses of
nationals, States often either offer these provisions only to
spouses of men and not to spouses of women, or have much
more stringent requirements for male foreign spouses. 38 Fi-
nally, some countries also discriminate against women's capac-
ity to pass their nationality to their children, even those born in
the mother's country of origin.
3 9
tion and Citizenship of Married Women Act, repealing earlier discriminatory
laws which required that the nationality of the wife follow that of the hus-
band. Id at 8. See MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 312 (1915) (addressing
1907 statute that provided that upon marriage to a foreigner, any American
woman shall take the nationality of her husband). The new law granted mar-
ried women independence regarding nationality. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND,
supra note 36, at 8.
In other countries such discrimination continues, even in countries that
automatically grant nationality to foreign wives of nationals. See, e.g., Com-
mittee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Second Periodic
Reports of States Parties: Philippines, at 77-78, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/13/AdcL
17 (1989) (Philippine nationality laws automatically consider a foreign woman
a Filipina if she marries a Filipino man). If her country of origin does not rec-
ognize dual citizenship she may lose her nationality upon the death of her hus-
band. MALVINA HALBERSTAM -& ELIzABETH F. DEFEiS, WOMEN'S LEGAL
RIGHTS 28-29 (1987) (noting that a country that has changed a woman's nation-
ality to that of her husband may upon his death deny her re-entry into her
country of origin because she is no longer a national).
38. See infra Appendix (specifically the reports of the Dominican Repub-
lic, Ghana, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Thailand and Yemen);
Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius; Views of the Human Rights Committee
Under Article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights Concerning Communication No. R.9/35, U.N. GAOR,
36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981), reprinted in 2 HUM. RTS.
L.J. 139-43 (1981) [hereinafter Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius]. See infra
notes 73-82 and accompanying text (discussing Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v.
Mauritius).
39. This type of discrimination occurs in States using thejus sanguinis ap-
proach to the acquisition of nationality. See supra note 21 (under jus
sanguinis nationality passes lineally, rather than territorially upon birth
within the nation's borders). Many countries employing the jus sanguinis ap-
proach grant nationality through the father only. These discriminatory provi-
sions deny citizenship to the children of a woman who marries a foreigner,
while granting citizenship to the children of a man who marries a foreigner.
This practice presents a serious problem in states with large numbers of immi-
grants or refugees where intermarriage with nationals occurs. The children of
women married to foreigners will not be nationals in their mother's country
and will be denied the benefits of citizenship. See infra notes 132-174 and ac-
companying text (discussing Dow). Unity Dow has stated that many women
living in Botswana in rural areas near the South African border have married
South Africans, unaware that their children are not legally citizens of Bot-
swana. Marsha A. Freeman, Women, Law and Land at the Local Level:
Claiming Women's Human Rights in Domestic Legal Systems, Address at the
Windsor Twelfth Symposium on Law and Development, University of Wind-
sor, Windsor, Ontario (March 1992) (available from the International Women's
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Given this continuing discrimination, the question arises as
to how women can use international human rights law to chal-
lenge discriminatory nationality laws.4° This Note examines
and evaluates the international standards and implementation
mechanisms. Part I discusses limitations on State sovereignty
under customary international law. Part H describes and eval-
uates the effectiveness of the implementation mechanisms of
various international treaties that proscribe gender discrimina-
tion in nationality laws. Part III explores the option of using
international standards to influence the interpretation of do-
mestic law through test cases. Part III also analyzes a test case
which successfully challenged a discriminatory nationality pro-
vision in Botswana. This Note concludes by recommending
stronger implementation mechanisms for the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Wo-
men, and by urging the use of international fora to enforce
treaty obligations and to create precedents recognizing nation-
ality rights. This Note also advocates challenging domestic na-
tionality provisions through test cases invoking international
standards to interpret domestic law.
I. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Customary international law consists of norms reflecting
the general practices that States follow due to a sense of legal
obligation.4 ' Customary norms bind all governments.42 Consis-
Rights Action Watch, Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of
Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN).
40. See generally Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to In-
ternational Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613 (1991); Anne F. Bayefsky, The Princi-
ple of Equality or Non-Discrimination in International Law, 11 HuM. RTS.
L.J. 1, 19 (1990).
41. FRANK NEwMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PRocEss 594 (citing North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases (W.Ger. v. Den.; W.Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44); BUERGENTHAL &
MAIER, supra note 23, at 24 (citing 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT]).
42. Even countries not party to a treaty codifying a norm are bound once
the norm becomes customary international law. MERON, supra note 17, at 3.
A party may gain other advantages from invoking a customary norm rather
than a human rights convention. In countries which treat customary law as
the law of the land, but which consider treaties to require domestic imple-
menting legislation to acquire internal force, customary law provides a basis
for a claim despite an absence of implementing legislation. Id. at 4-5. In addi-
tion, denunciations of or reservations to provisions of treaties which reflect
customary norms cannot affect the obligation of nations to conform to custom-
ary laws. Id at 6-7. Only governments which have expressly and persistently
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tent state practice, generally defined as "widespread accept-
ance" of a norm, is evidence of the ripening of a norm into
customary international law.43 Customary law norms are de-
veloping continuously,44 a process that often results in disagree-
ment as to whether a given norm has risen to the status of
customary international law.45
Commentators disagree about whether a customary inter-
national norm exists prohibiting sex discrimination in national-
ity laws.46 Such a customary norm could derive from either
customary law concerning nationality or from the evolution of
a non-discrimination principle into international custom. Be-
cause nationality laws enjoy a presumption of sovereign privi-
lege,47 international law scholars hesitate to conclude that new
objected to the development of the norm are not bound. RESTATEMENT, supra
note 41, § 102 cmt. d. When a new state comes into existence and is admitted
to the community of nations, it is bound by existing customary international
law. Id; VON GLAHN, supra note 26, at 19.
43. See BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 5-6 (quoting Fisheries Jurisdiction
(U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 4); VON GLAHN, supra note 26, at 20 ("Observed re-
peated practice by itself is not sufficient evidence of the existence of a rule of
customary law; there must have evolved an obligatory, or binding, aspect to
the practice in question.").
However, wide acceptance of international treaties, declarations, resolu-
tions and other instruments has arguably become a more significant indicator
of the creation of customary law in the human rights field than State practice.
The authority for use of statutory international law in developing customary
norms stems from Article 38 (1)(c) of the I.C.J. statute which allows the Court
to apply "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." MERON,
supra note 17, at 98; NEWMAN & WEissBRODT, supra note 41, at 595. See also
MERON, supra note 17, at 99-102 (analyzing human rights norms as sources of
customary international law).
44. See, e.g., MERON, supra note 17, at 99 ("Given the rapid, continued de-
velopment of international human rights, the list [of norms rising to the status
of customary international law] should be regarded as essentially open
ended."); Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, in 178
REcUE L DES CouPs 21, 338 (1982).
45. NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 41, at 595; VON GLAHN, supra
note 26, at 17.
46. Compare THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW-MAKING IN THE
UNITED NATIONS 54 (1986) (noting that in contrast to racial discrimination,
sexual discrimination does not reflect customary international law) and
Schachter, supra note 44, at 335-36 (noting that State behavior does not com-
port with the claim that equality between men and women is international
custom) with McDouGAL ET AL., supra note 16, at 273-74, 326 (noting that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights provisions prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of sex bind all nations as customary law) and RESTATEMENT,
supra note 42, § 702, cmt. I ("[Fjreedom from gender discrimination as state
policy, in many matters, may already be a principle of customary international
law.").
47. See supra notes 21, 24-25.
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customary international law norms regulating nationality have
emerged.48 The foremost modern legal scholar of nationality
cites the prohibition of discriminatory denationalization as the
only nationality norm that possibly has attained customary in-
ternational law status.49
As for the international acceptance of a non-discrimination
principle, although commentators have uniformly posited non-
discrimination on the basis of race as a customary international
law norm,50 non-discrimination on the basis of sex does not en-
48. See, e.g., WEIS, supra note 12, at 250 (criticizing as wishful thinking the
work of other scholars who have claimed the elevation of nationality norms to
customary international law status).
49. Id. at 248. Weis does not, however, define "discriminatory." He be-
lieves that such a norm is more properly based on the non-discrimination prin-
ciple in international law. Id. at 247, 248. Weis' conclusions complement those
of other scholars of international law. See, eg., Richard B. Lillich, Civil
Rights, in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND PoLicY Is-
SUES 154 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984) ("[U]ntil the prescriptions of Article 15 [of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights] receive wider and stronger sup-
port, the 'right to nationality' will remain a relatively meaningless right and
certainly not one recognized by customary international law."); VAN PANHUYS,
supra note 17, at 222 (claiming that the right to nationality is a meaningless
phrase without agreement among States on the conditions under which the na-
tionality of a state might be legally demanded); RUTH DONNER, THE REGULA-
TION OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 148-49, 161 (1983) (claiming that
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a morally but not legally bind-
ing document and that the provisions of the 1957 Convention on the National-
ity of Married Women are not customary international law). But see Chan,
supra note 21, at 10-11 (citing evidence of state practice among parties to the
European Convention on Human Rights and the large number of bilateral and
multilateral treaties with provisions aimed at preventing statelessness as evi-
dence of the evolution of certain customary norms). Chan submits that the
right of a stateless child to the nationality of the State of its birth has now
formed part of customary international law. Id at 11. He also posits that
although customary international law mandates few positive duties to confer
nationality, it creates a negative duty not to cause statelessness or to impede
arbitrarily the exercise of a right to change one's nationality. I&; see also Ad-
visory Opinion on Costa Rica's Naturalization Provisions, supra note 24, at 163.
50. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law recognizes the norm
against "systematic racial discrimination" as constituting customary interna-
tional law. RESTATEMENT, supra note 42, § 702. Professor Schachter also in-
cludes such discrimination among the rights recognized in the Declaration of
Human Rights which have a strong claim to customary international law sta-
tus. Schachter, supra note 44, at 336; see also MERON, supra note 46, at 7
(1986) (stating that the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination developed a fundamental norm of the United
Nations Charter which is now "accepted into the corpus of customary interna-
tional law-requiring respect for and observance of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race"); Bayefsky, supra note
40, at 19 (suggesting that the norm of non-discrimination has become a rule of
customary international law).
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joy the same consensus.5 ' Historically, treaty drafters have
viewed a norm of equality for women as impossible to achieve
due to the reality of widespread discriminatory State practice
and, therefore, as jeopardizing the universality of more general
human rights treaties. 52 Although a large number of countries
have ratified the Women's Convention, for example, more
countries have ratified it with reservations than other human
rights treaties.53 These reservations reduce the likelihood of
recognition of the principle of non-discrimination on the basis
51. MERON, supra note 46, at 54 (noting that unlike the norm outlawing
racial discrimination, no comparable norm against gender discrimination has
developed); Schachter, supra note 44, at 335-36 (noting that State behavior
does not comport with the claim that equality between men and women is in-
ternational custom). But see Bayefsky, supra note 40, at 20-22 (noting six rea-
sons why "international law indicates that distinctions based on sex in
particular are deserving of the highest degree of scrutiny").
52. This "problem" has led treaty drafters to include provisions allowing
limited reservations to the gender-related provisions of broader treaties or to
reject language or provisions proposed by women's rights advocates as too
threatening to the universal application of the treaty. See, e.g., LAUTERPACHT,
supra note 19, at 338-40. In his 1950 proposal for an International Bill of the
Rights of Man, Professor Lauterpacht reasoned that to "include specifically
non-discrimination on account of sex among the obligations of the Bill is
either to jeopardize, to that extent, its binding character or to make it impossi-
ble for some States to subscribe to it consistently with a determination to
abide by its provisions." Id. at 338-39.
For an example of an instance in which language proposed by women's
groups for inclusion in a treaty concerning women was rejected, see infra note
57, describing the process leading to the adoption of the Hague Nationality
Convention during which suggestions made by women's groups were systemat-
ically rejected; see also Cook, supra note 32, at 644 ('The Women's Convention
may face the paradox of maximizing its universal application at the cost of
compromising its integrity.").
53. A reservation is an indication made by a State upon ratification of a
multilateral treaty that it does not intend to be bound by a particular provision
of the treaty. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, pt.
1, art. 2, 1(d), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27,
1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Of the 116 States Parties to the Wo-
men's Convention as of July 31, 1992, see supra note 35, more than 40 have
ratified with reservations. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 35, at 170-
78 (providing reservations as of December 31, 1991); Cook, supra note 32, at
687-692. See generally Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations
Regime and the Convention on Discrimination Against Women 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 281 (1991); Charlesworth et al., supra note 40, at 633-34. The Women's
Convention contains an article providing for limited reservations, but a signifi-
cant number of states have also reserved from the general non-discrimination
provisions, which form the heart of the treaty. Countries reserving generally
from the definition of discrimination in Article 1 or from Article 2 are Libya,
Tunisia (by declaration), United Kingdom, Bangladesh, Egypt, New Zealand
(for the Cook Islands), and Iraq. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 35, at
170-76.
Many Islamic countries have reserved from the general non-discrimina-
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of sex as customary international law.-
Given the extent of current discriminatory State practice,
the many reservations to the substance of the Women's Con-
vention, and the traditional deference to state sovereignty in
nationality laws, no customary standard has emerged that binds
all nations. Customary international law thus fails to provide a
clear and universally recognized prohibition of gender discrimi-
nation in nationality laws.
II. STATUTORY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Treaties concerning gender discrimination and nationality
laws are of two types: specialized treaties involving national-
ity,55 and general human rights treaties containing either a
non-discrimination provision, or a provision on the right to a
nationality, or both.-
A. SPECIALIZED TREATIES
In 1930 the League of Nations began a period of develop-
ment of treaties dealing with nationality laws by including na-
tionality among areas of international law ripe for
codification.57 The primary objective during this period was to
tion principle of Article 2 for reasons relating to Islamic law. IAl at 171-73
(describing the reservations of Egypt, Iraq and Libya).
54. MERON, supra note 17, at 16.
55. See, ag., Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, supra
note 30.
56. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 29, pmbl.,
arts. 2, 15. Other provisions in international human rights treaties have been
invoked to support claims of discrimination in nationality laws based upon the
secondary effects of the discrimination. These include the rights to freedom of
movement, of entry and exit from one's State, to marry and form a family, and
to enjoyment of one's culture. See ifira notes 72 (discussing Lovelace) and 73-
82 (discussing Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius).
57. The Hague Codification Conference of 1930 produced the Hague Na-
tionality Convention. Several entities argued for the inclusion of non-discrimi-
nation principles. International women's organizations submitted a draft
convention to the Hague Conference which incorporated the general principle
that a woman's nationality should not be affected by marriage. See RESEARCH
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: NATIONALITY, RE PONSIBILITY OF STATES, TERRITO-
RIAL WATERS, DRAFrs OF CONVENTIONS PREPARED IN ANTICIPATION OF THE
FIRST CONFERENCE ON THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 124 (1929)
[hereinafter RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAw] (including text of the Provi-
sional Draft Convention on the Nationality of Married Women which the In-
ternational Woman's Suffrage Alliance approved in Rome in 1923). The
faculty of Harvard law school prepared a Draft Codification for the Hague
Conference with a provision requiring that a woman retain her nationality af-
ter marriage to an alien unless she both acquires the nationality of her hus-
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reconcile nationality laws and thereby reduce cases of double
nationality and statelessness.s International acceptance of the
principle of equality of the sexes in nationality laws first oc-
curred at the regional level. At a regional conference in 1933,
many American states signed the Montevideo Convention on
Nationality of Women and the Montevideo Convention on Na-
tionality.59 The first convention provides that among parties,
"[t]here shall be no distinction based on sex as regards national-
ity in their legislation or in their practice." 6 The second pro-
vides that "[n]either matrimony nor its dissolution affects the
nationality of the husband or wife or of their children."
6
'
1
In 1957, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the
Nationality of Married Women.62 The drafters envisioned this
treaty as a narrow response to an immediate problem, rather
than a treaty dealing with all aspects of discrimination against
women in nationality laws.6 Although the U.N. Commission
on the Status of Women proposed a gender-neutral treaty con-
cerning the nationality of married persons, that approach was
band and establishes permanent residence in his country. Id at 69; see
DONNER, supra note 49, at 55-61 (comparing the provisions of the Harvard
Draft and the Convention adopted at the Hague Conference). In spite of these
recommendations, the Convention merely conditioned the loss of a woman's
nationality upon marriage to an alien upon the woman's acquisition of her hus-
band's nationality. At the time of the Hague Conference, only five countries
did not grant their nationality to the wife of a national upon marriage. RE-
SEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra, at 70. Hence, this restriction had lim-
ited practical application. After the Hague Conference, the Commission of
Representatives of Women's Organizations submitted a report to the Secre-
tary-General of the League of Nations stressing the importance of equality be-
tween the sexes and recommending reconsideration of the Hague Nationality
Convention and deletion of the "articles that discriminated against women."
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, supra note 36, at 11.
58. HIsTORICAL BACKGROUND, supra note 36, at 10.
59. Montevideo Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, Dec.
26, 1933, rep7inted in Report of the Delegates of the United States of America
to the Seventh International Conference of American States, U.S. Dep't of
State, Conference Series No. 19 (1933).
60. I& art. 1.
61. I& art. 6.
62. Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, supra note 30. As
of December 31, 1991, there were 57 States Parties and 27 signatories to this
treaty. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 35, at 638. The Convention on
the Nationality of Married Women has had considerable effect by virtue of the
number of parties, 57, and its indirect influence on national legislation. WEIS,
supra note 12, at 248.
63. The drafters were concerned primarily with reducing the incidence of
statelessness resulting from compulsory denationalization of women upon
marriage. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, supra note 36, at 27-28.
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rejected.6 The treaty provides that neither the celebration nor
the dissolution of a marriage shall automatically affect the na-
tionality of the wife.65 It also expressly allows States Parties to
grant wives of nationals naturalization privileges not given to
husbands of nationals.6
Although these early, specific treaties remain in effect,
they have largely been superseded in practice by the more com-
prehensive instruments that make up the International Bill of
Human Rights,67 by regionally-based human rights instruments
and, in the field of gender discrimination, by the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women.68
64. Ia at 13-24 (describing history of the consideration of the treaty
within the United Nations system).
65. Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, supra note 30, arts.
1, 3. This treaty did not include provisions concerning equality with respect to
children of the marriage. The only international body other than CEDAW to
deal directly with the questions of the effect of the nationality of spouses on
children of the marriage is the Council of Europe. The Committee of Minis-
ters, a policymaking body comprised of representatives of the member states
of the Council of Europe, NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 41, at 464,
adopted two resolutions in 1977. Resolution (77) 12 recommends that States
move toward ending distinctions between spouses of men and women in natu-
ralization laws as part of the broader movement toward the establishment of
legal equality between the sexes. Nationality of spouses of different national-
ities and nationality of children born in wedlock, Comm. of Ministers of the
Council of Europe, Res. No. (77) 12 and Explanatory Memoranda (adopted
May 27, 1977). Resolution (77) 13 recommends that States grant their nation-
ality at birth to children born in wedlock if either the father or mother is a
national, in order to give men and women equal rights concerning their chil-
dren. 1d. Res. No. (77) 13.
66. Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, supra note 30, art.
3. While naturalization provisions favorable to wives may seem to discriminate
in favor of women, refusing to allow husbands to apply for special naturaliza-
tion provisions has an adverse effect on female citizens which gender-neutral
treaty language would prohibit. See infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text(discussing Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius). For a discussion of the ramifi-
cations of such discrimination and how to best characterize it, see Tom Mullen,
Nationality and Immigration, in THE LEGAL RELEVANCE OF GENDER 158
(Sheila McLean & Noreen Burrows eds., 1988).
67. The International Bill of Human Rights includes the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and its Optional Protocol, and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. NEwMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 41, at 2.
68. Unlike the early nationality treaties, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, the regional treaties and the Women's Convention
include implementation mechanisms. See, e.g., International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, supra note 29, arts. 40-45; Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302,(entered into force March 23, 1976) [hereinafter Optional Protocol], reprinted
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B. GENERAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
forbids discrimination on the basis of sex.6 9 The Covenant es-
tablished the Human Rights Committee as a monitoring and
enforcement mechanism.70 The Optional Protocol to the Cove-
nant provides for a communications procedure whereby individ-
uals may bring complaints to the Human Rights Committee
concerning violations of their rights.71 Women have success-
fully used this mechanism to challenge sex discrimination in
nationality and related laws.72
in INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 18, at 38-42; Women's Conven-
tion, supra note 29, arts. 17, 18.
69. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 29,
art. 2, 11
70. Id. arts. 28-45.
71. States subject to this procedure are those States Parties to the Polit-
ical Covenant which have also accepted the Human Rights Committee's com-
petence to consider individual communications by ratifying the Optional
Protocol. Optional Protocol, supra note 68, art. 1.
72. The Human Rights Committee has heard two cases related to gender
discrimination in nationality laws. In both cases, the Committee found the dis-
crimination a violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. See infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text (discussing discrimina-
tory residency and naturalization provisions in Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauri-
tius).
The Human Rights Committee's decision in Lovelace v. Canada, Commu-
nication No. R.6/24, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 166, U.N. Doc.
A/36/40, reprinted in 2 HuM. RTS. L.J. 158-67 (1981), provides less guidance
than the Aumeeruddy case. Sandra Lovelace, a 32-year old woman living in
Canada, was born and registered as a "Maliseet Indian" in accordance with
Canada's Indian Act. Id 1. She later married a man who was not a member
of the tribe and consequently lost her status as a member of the tribe under
another provision of the Indian Act. Id. In contrast, male members of the
tribe did not lose their status as Indians under the Act upon marrying outside
the tribe. Sandra Lovelace challenged this discriminatory provision in a com-
munication to the Human Rights Committee under the Optignal Protocol.
Lovelace alleged that the Act was contrary to Articles 2 (1), 3 and 26, the
sex discrimination and equal protection provisions, Articles 23 (1) and (4), the
provisions relating to the protection of the family and the equality of spouses,
and Article 27, the provision protecting the rights of minorities. Id- The
Human Rights Committee acknowledged that the right to protection of family
life and children under Articles 17, 23 and 24, the right to choose one's resi-
dence under Article 12, and the right to nondiscrimination on the basis of sex
under Articles 2, 3 and 26 were potentially implicated in the case, but declined
to reach the merits on these issues. Id. 18.
The Committee, however, found that denying Sandra Lovelace the right
to reside on the reserve was unreasonable and not necessary to preserve the
identity of the tribe. Thus, "read in the context of the other provisions," the
Act, by preventing her recognition as a member of the band, violated her
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The Human Rights Committee addressed sex discrimina-
tion in statutes regulating the residency and naturalization of
aliens married to nationals in Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauri-
tius.73 In 1977, Mauritius amended its Immigration Act and De-
portation Act to limit residency rights of alien husbands
married to Mauritian women, but not of alien wives of Mauri-
tian men. Twenty Mauritian women challenged the laws
through a communication to the Human Rights Committee.74
The women challenged the statutes as violations of the sex-dis-
crimination provisions of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights,75 the equal protection provision, 76 the pro-
vision securing the right to participation in public affairs, 77 and
the provisions for protection of the family.78 In its submission
to the Human Rights Committee, Mauritius admitted that the
statutes discriminated on the basis of sex, that choosing to leave
the country because her husband cannot stay in Mauritius may
affect a woman's ability to exercise her rights to participate in
public affairs, and that the exclusion of a person whose family
is living in the country may result in an infringement of that
person's rights to family life. Mauritius stated, however, that if
the exclusion of a non-citizen is lawful and based upon security
or public interest grounds, it cannot be an arbitrary interfer-
ence with the family life of its nationals.79
rights under Article 27, which protects the rights of members of minority com-
munities to enjoy their culture, religion and language. I& 17. The Commit-
tee stated that her rights to freedom from sex discrimination "are only
indirectly at stake" and that "[t]he facts of the case do not seem to require fur-
ther examination under these articles" because of its finding of unjustifiable
interference with Sandra Lovelace's minority rights under Article 27. Id. 18.
Rebecca Cook explains the Committee's failure to reach the issue of gen-
der discrimination explicitly, in spite of the fact that it read Article 27 "in the
context of the other provisions," id. % 17, as due to the fact that Lovelace mar-
ried before the Covenant came into force in Canada. Rebecca J. Cook, The In-
ternational Right to Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex, 14 YALE J. INT. L.
161, 177 (1989).
73. Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius, supra note 38, at 139; see also
Bayefsky, supra note 40, passim (analyzing the non-discrimination jurispru-
dence of the Human Rights Committee).
74. Mauritius is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights and its Optional Protocol. MULTATERAL TREATMS, supra note 35,
at 133, 161.
75. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 29,
art. 2, 11 1, 3.
76. Id art. 26.
77. Id art. 25.
78. Id arts. 17 and 23.
79. Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius, supra note 38, 5.1 - 5.7.
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The decision of the Human Rights Committee in the
Aumeeruddy-Cziffra case rested primarily upon the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' prohibitions
against sex discrimination80 The Committee stated that parties
to the Covenant cannot limit a right guaranteed by the Cove-
nant in a gender discriminatory fashion, regardless of whether
the restriction would be independently permissible in isola-
tion.81 The Committee also found that the Mauritius laws in-
terfering with the family protection provisions violated the
Covenant's prohibition of sex discrimination.8 2
Although the Human Rights Committee has heard few
cases on the subject of nationality, the result in Aumeeruddy-
Cziffra is promising. The Human Rights Committee has also
stated in three out of nineteen General Comments that it con-
siders some types of discrimination in nationality and immigra-
tion provisions to be contrary to provisions of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.s3 A barrier remains,
however, in the requirement that a complainant assert infringe-
80. Id. 9.2(b)2(i)6 (citing Article 2, $% 1, 3 of the Covenant).
81. Id. 1 9.2(b)2(i)8. The Committee did not reach the issue of whether
the naturalization law created an arbitrary interference with the family with-
out regard to the discrimination in violation of Article 17 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Id. % 9.2(b)2(i)8. Instead, the Commit-
tee found that an adverse distinction was made affecting a right guaranteed by
the Covenant without justification. Id.
82. Id % 9.2(b)2(ii)3-4 ("[The protection of a family cannot vary with the
sex of the one or the other spouse."). The Committee stated that such discrim-
ination cannot be justified even on security grounds. Id-
83. General Comment 19 states: 'With regard to equality as to marriage,
the Committee wishes to note in particular that no sex-based discrimination
should occur in respect of the acquisition or loss of nationality by reason of
marriage." Human Rights Committee, General Comment 19, % 6, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/AdcL2 (1990).
General Comment 4 cites "the degree to which immigration laws which
distinguish between a male and a female citizen may or may not adversely af-
fect the scope of the right of the woman to marriage to non-citizens or to hold
public office" as an example of provisions of the Covenant which may affect a
State's ability to regulate in areas seemingly unrelated to treaty provisions.
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 4, I 3, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1 (1989).
General Comment 17 on the rights of the child states: "[N]o discrimina-
tion with regard to the acquisition of nationality should be admissible under
internal law as between legitimate children and children born out of wedlock
or of stateless parents or based on the nationality status of one or both of the
parents." Human Rights Committee, General Comment 17, 1 8, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1 (1989). But see Andrew C. Byrnes, The "Other" Human
Rights Treaty Body: The Work of the Committee on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination Against Women, 14 YALE J. INT'L. L. 1, 51 (1989) (noting the lack
of recognition of gender rights in the General Comments).
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ment of a specific provision of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights on the basis of sex.84 Unlike the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights,a5 the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights does not recognize a general
right to a nationality.86 A complainant, therefore, must argue
infringement of a woman's right to marry and form a family,
her right to participate in public affairs, or some other in-
dependent right guaranteed by the Covenant on which the dis-
criminatory nationality law impinges.8 7 Thus, a complainant
cannot be guaranteed a hearing in this forum.
2. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women contains the most explicit prohibi-
tion of gender discrimination in nationality laws of any human
rights treaty.88 The Convention established the Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) to
monitor implementation of the Convention.8 9 The Convention
84. See supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text (discussing Lovelace and
Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius).
85. See supra note 29 (noting that Article 15 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights provides that everyone has the right to a nationality and also
protects against arbitrary denial of a nationality or the right to change
nationality).
86. Although the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was
drafted to make binding treaty obligations of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, Article 24(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights, providing that "every child has the right to a nationality," contains
the only mention of nationality. International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra note 29, art. 24, 3. The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights does not create any binding obligation upon States Parties to
grant their nationality. Nor does it protect against arbitrary deprivation or
provide a right to change nationality, as did Article 15(2) of the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights. See Chan, supra note 21, at 4-5 (discussing the
travaux preparatoire of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights concerning the nationality provision and noting that the provision does
not necessarily require states to confer nationality on every child born in their
territory). See generally MARc J. BOssUYT, GUIDE TO THE "TRAvAux
PREPARATOIRES" OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS (1987) (providing extensive discussion of legislative history).
87. Conflicting priorities of the Human Rights Committee may also jeop-
ardize results in some cases. See supra note 72 (discussing Lovelace and noting
that although the communicant prevailed in that case, the Human Rights
Committee based its decision on her right to participate in her minority as de-
fined in Art. 27, rather than on sex discrimination).
88. See supra notes 33-34 (describing provisions of Women's Convention).
89. Women's Convention, supra note 29, art. 17.
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empowered CEDAW to require and review reports from States
Parties about their nationality laws, and question States' repre-
sentatives on their compliance with the treaty °
Although the treaty has a large number of States Parties
bound to enforce its provisions, 91 the Women's Convention has
the weakest implementation mechanisms of any human rights
convention adopted since 1965.92 Even non-reserving States
Parties to the Women's Convention are bound only to submit
periodic reports on their compliance with the treaty to
CEDAW.9 3 The treaty contains no provision for individual or
inter-State complaints to the Committee.9 CEDAW itself
90. Id. arts. 20-21. CEDAW is empowered to consider reports submitted
by States Parties and to make suggestions and general recommendations based
on its examination of the reports and information it receives from States Par-
ties. Id. art. 20. Under the reporting scheme, parties to the Women's Conven-
tion must submit reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations
concerning "the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures which
they have adopted to give effect to the provisions of the [convention] and on
the progress made [in that regard]." Id. art. 18. These reports must be filed
within one year after the State becomes a party and at least once every four
years thereafter. Id. Several shortcomings of the reporting scheme have been
noted. See infra Appendix. The most comprehensive analysis of the reporting
process and its strengths and weaknesses can be found in Byrnes, supra note
83, at 12-28 (discussing submission and adequacy, status and quality of the re-
ports, the problem of overdue and inadequate reports, the "constructive dia-
logue" of the reviewing process, CEDAW's procedures, follow-up, and the
problems created by the current backlog of reports). Byrnes notes that the
differential treatment of men and women in nationality laws has been a topic
of questioning by CEDAW. Id. at 29. CEDAW's documentation function can
be extremely valuable. See supra note 36 (indicating that CEDAW reports and
reports of States Parties to the Women's Convention comprise the only cur-
rent collection of information on the nationality laws of individual states). On
the importance of disseminating States Parties' reports to CEDAW, see
Byrnes, supra note 83, at 8, 65-66.
91. See supra note 35 (as of July 31, 1992, 116 States are parties to the Wo-
men's Convention).
92. Holt, supra note 30, at § 17.02[3][d][fi][c][1]. See generally Sandra
Coliver, United Nations Machineries on Women's Rights: How Might They
Better Help Women Whose Rights Are Being Violated?, in NEw DIRECTIONS IN
HUMAN RIGHTS 25 (Ellen L. Lutz et al. eds., 1989).
93. Women's Convention, supra note 29, art. 18. See supra note 90 (noting
that reports are required only once every four years). But cf. DOMINIC Mc-
GOLD~icK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITrEE, ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 98-104
(1991) (characterizing reporting system as successful).
94. Part V of the Women's Convention provides for implementation
mechanisms. Women's Convention, supra note 29, art. 21. For comparisons of
the implementation mechanisms of CEDAW with the committees established
to implement other human rights treaties, especially the Convention on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the International Covenant on Civil
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meets for shorter periods95 and has fewer enforcement mecha-
nisms and fewer resources than other human rights treaty bod-
ies, including the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination.9 6
Another barrier to implementation of the Women's Con-
vention stems from the number of reservations to its substan-
tive provisions.97 As of December 1991, three states had ratified
with general reservations to the treaty as a whole, and seven
states had ratified with a reservation to Article 2, the basic non-
discrimination statement upon which the remaining substantive
articles expand.98 Ten countries currently maintain reserva-
tions to the nationality provision.9
CEDAW has recently shown signs of improving implemen-
tation of the Women's Convention, addressing many of the
problems outlined above. CEDAW recently affirmed its power
to issue General Comments, authoritative interpretations of the
treaty provisions similar to those promulgated by the Human
Rights Committee.1°° The Committee recently adopted a Gen-
and Political Rights, see Byrnes, supra note 83, at 4; MERON, supra note 46, at
53.
95. ANDREW BYRNES, INTERNATIONAL WOMEN's RIGHTS ACTION WATCH,
CEDAW No. 10: BUILDING ON A DECADE OF ACHIEvEMENr: A REPORT ON THE
TENTH SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN 12 (1991). As Byrnes notes in this report, Article 20 of the
Women's Convention states that the Committee should normally meet for a
two-week session. Id- at 13. He and others have described the significant
backlog of reports of States Parties awaiting review by CEDAW created by the
inadequate meeting time. Id at 12; Byrnes, supra note 83, at 27; see also
Coliver, supra note 92, at 36-37.
96. Holt, supra note 30, § 17.02[3][d][ii][c][1]; Byrnes, supra note 83, at 5
n.19, 57-59 (noting that CEDAW is in a "particularly disadvantaged" position
because it began with such a low level of secretariat support). Although the
United Nations Charter recognizes the protection of human rights as one of its
four purposes, the U.N. has allocated only 0.7% of its budget to achieving that
purpose. Torkel Opsahl, Instruments of Implementation of Human Rights, 10
HuM. RTS. L. J. 13, 33 n.58 (1989).
97. See Cook, supra note 32, at 643-44; Clark, supra note 53, at 316-20.
98. See MULT ATERAL TREATIES, supra note 35, at 170-78.
99. See id. Egypt's reservation, for example, states that "it is customary
for a woman to agree, upon marrying an alien, that her children shall be of the
father's nationality," yet it asserts that this custom does not infringe on the
principle of equality between men and women. Id. at 171. Ireland withdrew
its reservation to Art. 9 on Dec. 19, 1986. Id. at 182 n.15. Jordan, however, re-
cently ratified with a reservation to Article 9(2). See supra note 35.
100. CEDAW decided at its 1992 session to begin making general comments
on each substantive article of the Convention starting in 1993 at its Twelfth
Session. CEDAW included Article 9 as one of three articles it will address
first, in preparation for the International Year of the Family in 1994.
ARvONNE S. FRASER & MIRANDA KAZANTsIS, INTERNATIONAL WOMEN's
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eral Recommendation on reservations as part of a strategy to
deal with the issue of extensive reservation of the treaty provi-
sions.1' 1 CEDAW met for four additional days in 1988, and ob-
tained approval for a three-week session in 1993.102 It has also
established working groups which meet prior to its two-week
annual meeting.10 3 Although these developments are signifi-
cant, CEDAW still has limited capacity at the present time to
enforce the norms codified in the Women's Convention. De-
spite the recommendations of several commentators, 10 4
CEDAW recently decided against pursuing an optional protocol
to create an individual communication procedure.10 5 Thus, un-
RIGHTS ACTION WATCH, CEDAW No. 11, 10 (1992). For a comparison of the
use of the power to issue general comments or recommendations by the
Human Rights Committee, by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, and by CEDAW, see Byrnes, supra note 83, at 42-51.
101. The inherent weakness of the treaty itself has rendered it difficult for
CEDAW to address the many reservations to the Women's Convention.
Whereas the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Ra-
cial Discrimination provided that a reservation will be considered incompatible
with the Convention if at least 2/3 of the States Parties object to it, the Wo-
men's Convention contains no analogous provision. Id. at 55. The issue of res-
ervations has been raised at the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh CEDAW
meetings. At the Eleventh Meeting, the Committee adopted General Recom-
mendation No. 20 requesting that the Chairperson of the Committee raise the
issue of reservations to human rights treaties at the preparatory meetings for
the 1993 world human rights conference. FRASER & KAZANTSIS, supra note
100, at 11. See generally Cook, supra note 32; Clark, supra note 53 (analyzing
the legal status of reservations to the Women's Convention).
102. BYRNES, supra note 95, at 12; FRASER & KAZANTSIS, supra note 100, at
7.
103. BYRNES, supra note 95, at 14. But see Theodor Meron, Enhancing the
Effectiveness of the Prohibition of Discrimination Against Women, 84 AM. J.
INT'L L. 213 (concluding that attempts to reduce CEDAW's backlog in review-
ing reports by convening a pre-sessional working group "have not fully served
the purpose" and that a better solution is needed).
104. See, e.g., Meron, supra note 103, at 216-17.
105. Fraser and Kazantsis report that CEDAW decided not to pursue op-
tional substantive or procedural protocols because the effort required to create
and adopt international procedural mechanisms would detract from CEDAW's
efforts to eliminate discrimination against women by making substantive
changes at the national and local levels. FRASER & KAZANTSIS, supra note 100,
at 4. CEDAW may also have considered its experience with reservations to be
indicative of the likelihood that States Parties would ratify such a protocol.
For example, eighteen countries have entered reservations to Article 29, which
provides for arbitration of disputes by the International Court of Justice.
MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 35, at 169-83. The experience of the
Human Rights Committee is also instructive. Of the 100 countries that have
ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, only 60 have
accepted the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Committee over individual com-
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like the Human Rights Committee or the regional human
rights bodies, CEDAW provides no help in individual cases.
C. REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
In addition to the human rights treaties adopted under the
auspices of the United Nations, regional intergovernmental or-
ganizations in Europe, Africa and the Americas have developed
systems for the protection of human rights.1°6 The American
Convention on Human Rights, adopted under the auspices of
the Organization of American States, is the only internationally
binding instrument that contains a general right to a
nationality. 107
The most encouraging recent international development in
the enforcement of a non-discrimination norm in nationality
laws is the 1984 advisory opinion by the Inter-American Court
munications by ratifying the Optional Protocol. MULTILATERAL TREATIES,
supra note 35, at 133, 161.
Byrnes has suggested that CEDAW encourage the development of the con-
fidential communications procedure of the Commission on the Status of Wo-
men as an alternative. Byrnes, supra note 83, at 63.
106. See generally THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
IN A NUTSHELL 81-186 (1988). The European Convention on Human Rights au-
thorized the creation of the European Commission of Human Rights and the
European Court of Human Rights. European Convention, supra note 30, art.
19. The Inter-American system includes the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The Commis-
sion and the Court interpret and monitor enforcement of the American Decla-
ration on the Rights and Duties of Man and the American Convention on
Human Rights. THOMAS BUERGENTHAL ET AL., PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE AMERICAS 15-26 (3d ed. 1990).
The newest regional human rights system began in 1981 with the Organi-
zation of African Unity's adoption of the African Charter on Human and Peo-
ples' Rights. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES AND How To USE THEM, No. 2, THE ORGANIZA-
TION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (1991). This Charter created
the African Commission on Human and People's Rights. I& Duties of the Af-
rican Commission include: ensuring the protection of specified human rights,
interpreting provisions of the Charter, examining inter-state complaints, and
considering other complaints by individuals and groups. Id. at 8. See Bu-
ERGENTHAL, supra, at 171-86.
107. Chan, supra note 21, at 5. Article 20 of the Convention provides that:
1. Every person has the right to a nationality.
2. Every person has the right to the nationality of the state in whose
territory he was born if he does not have the right to any other
nationality.
3. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality or of the
right to change it.
American Convention, supra note 29, art. 20. The American Convention also
contains a non-discrimination provision and an equal protection provision. Id
arts. 1(1), 24.
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of Human Rights regarding the compatibility of proposed
amendments to Costa Rica's naturalization laws with the
American Convention. 0 8 Applying the nationality and non-dis-
crimination provisions of the Convention to Costa Rica's pro-
posed amendments, the Inter-American Court recognized that
arbitrary deprivation of nationality would result in the effective
deprivation of all of the civil and political rights that national-
ity provides.'0 9 The court further stated that the determination
of a person's nationality no longer lies within the sole jurisdic-
tion of States, but that international law and the international
system for the protection of human rights impose limits on
108. Advisory Opinion on Costa Rica's Naturalization Provisions, supra
note 24. This decision, resulting not from an adversarial process, but from a
request by the government of Costa Rica for an advisory opinion, id- 8, is the
most definitive statement to date from an international body that gender dis-
crimination in nationality laws violates human rights principles.
The European Court of Human Rights addressed gender discrimination in
the immigration laws of the United Kingdom in Abdulaziz Cabales v. United
Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 45 (1985). This case suggests that the
regional human rights machinery in Europe will examine critically nationality
laws which discriminate on the basis of sex. The applicants in Abdulazi
Cabales challenged immigration laws granting unequal rights for male and fe-
male immigrants settled in the U.K. to obtain permission for their alien
spouses or fiance(e)s to enter or remain in the country, rather than rights to
obtain U.K. citizenship or nationality. Id. at 11. Because the European Con-
vention does not mention immigration or nationality, the applicants based
their claims on Art. 3 (degrading treatment) and Art. 8 (respect for family
life) in conjunction with Art. 14 (right to enjoyment of rights guaranteed by
the Convention without regard to race, sex, etc.). Id Declining to find in-
dependent violations of either Art. 3 or Art. 8, the Court found that "Article
14 taken together with Article 8 [had] been violated by reason of discrimina-
tion against each of the applicants on the ground of sex." Id at 45. In its judg-
ment the Court stated that "the advancement of the equality of the sexes is
today a major goal in the member States of the Council of Europe. This
means that very weighty reasons would have to be advanced before a differ-
ence of treatment on the ground of sex could be regarded as compatible with
the Convention." Id at 38. But see Bayefsky, supra note 40, at 22-23 (report-
ing a decision of the European Commission of Human Rights upholding a dis-
criminatory practice).
The Abdulaziz Cabales case may prove to be persuasive in nationality
cases because the European Court of Human Rights rejected the discrimina-
tory provisions as unjustified by general immigration policies that do not in-
volve the additional consideration of nationality as a human right and
traditionally enjoy a presumption of sovereign privilege. For a critical analysis
of the practical effect of the decision, see Mullen, supra note 66, at 159-161 (de-
tailing the minimal government response to the decision-eliminating only the
discriminatory provision challenged and retaining many other discriminatory
provisions in the immigration laws-and suggesting that the remaining provi-
sions are open to challenge under the European Convention).
109. Advisory Opinion on Costa Rica's Naturalization Provisions, supra
note 24, 32, 34.
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States' powers."10 Weighing the various provisions of Costa
Rica's proposed amendments to its naturalization laws, the
court allowed the State significant sovereign prerogatives to ac-
cord preference to certain groups in its naturalization provi-
sions,1 ' but found that granting naturalization rights to wives
but not to husbands of Costa Ricans constituted sex discrimina-
tion in violation of the human rights principle of sex equal-
ity.112 The Court found that the amendments constituted
discrimination violative of Article 17(4) of the American Con-
vention on Human Rights concerning equality of rights and re-
sponsibilities within marriage, and Article 24, the equal
protection provision of the American Convention."
Appeal to an international treaty body, however, is not
available in all cases. Individual communications are available
only for complaints against States Parties to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Optional Proto-
col, member states of the OAS under the American Declaration
or the American Convention and some States Parties to the Eu-
ropean Convention." 4 Each implementation body imposes re-
quirements for the submission of communications. For
110. Id. 1 32, 38.
111. Id. 7 59-63.
112. Id. 67. The court noted that the proposal was based on two assump-
tions underlying the principle of family unity: 1) that all members of a family
should have the same nationality; 2) traditional notions of paternal authority
over the marital domicile and marital property. Thus "the right accorded to
women to acquire the nationality of their husbands was an outgrowth of conju-
gal inequality." Id. 64.
113. Id-
114. Under the Inter-American system, all member states of the OAS are
subject to the right of individual petition, either because they are parties to the
American Convention or through the obligations imposed by the Charter of
the Organization of American States. BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 106, at
113. An individual may only bring a case before the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, however, if the State Party has accepted the jurisdiction of the
Court under Article 62 of the American Convention. Otherwise the petition
will be considered only by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
Id- at 114. States may seek advisory opinions directly from the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights. IM. at 26.
Although the European Convention provides for individual complaints
against those High Contracting Parties which have separately recognized the
competence of the European Commission of Human Rights to receive them,
the European Convention does not contain a right to nationality or to be free
from discrimination in nationality laws. In order to succeed, a communicant
would have to assert improper infringement upon a right guaranteed by the
Convention on the basis of sex. See European Convention, supra note 30, arts.
8, 12, 13, 14. For an analysis of non-discrimination jurisprudence under the
European Convention, see Bayefsky, supra note 40.
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example, a complainant normally must prove that she has ex-
hausted domestic remedies.11 5 Weak enforcement mechanisms
and the significant time required to process a complaint hinder
the effectiveness of international treaty bodies. Such limita-
tions on enforcing human rights norms through international
human rights treaty bodies suggest a need for alternative
approaches.
III. USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS IN DOMESTIC
COURTS
Customary international law and treaty obligations may be
invoked in domestic courts. Customary international law binds
all States. 116 The binding nature of a treaty depends on
whether a country takes a monist or a dualist approach to in-
ternational obligations. Under a monist approach a country
considers treaty obligations part of its domestic law and action-
able in domestic courts.n 7 A country following a dualist ap-
proach requires the implementation of domestic legislation to
make international agreements binding in domestic courts."'
Therefore, depending on a state's approach, a party may cite
treaty obligations as binding on the government or as a means
of interpreting domestic statutes or constitutions so as not to
conflict with international obligations.
A developing body of law in common law countries evi-
dences growing jurisprudential support for applying interna-
tional standards in domestic cases. Two high-level judicial
colloquia for senior Commonwealth judges 1 9 have addressed
115. See Optional Protocol, supra note 68, art. 2; American Convention,
supra note 29, art. 46(i)(a); European Convention, supra note 30, art. 26. This
Note advocates the process of exhausting domestic remedies to inform domes-
tic courts of the government's international obligations. This approach as-
sumes the existence of a functioning legal system. In the absence of adequate
domestic remedies, an international forum provides the only possible option.
The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, for example, allows the Human Rights Committee to consider submis-
sions without exhaustion of domestic remedies "where the application of the
remedies is unreasonably prolonged." Optional Protocol, supra note 68, art. 5;
see also BUERGENTHAL, supra note 106, at 93-98, 148-49.
116. See supra note 42 (when a norm rises to the level of customary law,
countries are bound even if not signatories to a treaty codifying the norm); see
also MERON, supra note 17, at 3.
117. See NEwMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 41, at 554; see also Vienna
Convention, supra note 53, art. 18 (stating that states cannot use domestic laws
to defeat treaty obligations).
118. NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 41, at 554.
119. JUDIcIAL CoLLoQUIuM IN BANGALORE, DEVELOPING HUMAN RIGHTS
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the subject of the domestic application of international human
rights norms. 20 These conferences, the first held in Asia in
198812' and the second in Africa in 1989,122 resulted in the adop-
tion of the Bangalore Principlesm and the Harare Declaration
of Human Rights.' ?2 These collective statements reflect a rec-
ognition by senior Commonwealth judges of the role that
judges can and should play in implementing international
human rights standards.2 5
The Bangalore and Harare statements recognize that "a
new process has begun" as judges in diverse jurisdictions "have
begun to have recourse to, and to interpret fundamental rights
and obligations against the background of, international human
rights norms. 126 The statements advocate using international
human rights norms to resolve ambiguity or uncertainty in na-
tional constitutions and legislation and to fill gaps in the com-
JURISPRUDENCE: THE DOMESTc APPUCATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS,[hereinafter BANGALORE COLLOQUIUM]; JUDICIAL COLLOQUIUM IN HARARE,
DEVELOPING HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: A SECOND JUDICIAL COLLO-
QUIUM ON THE DOMESTIC APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
NORMS, [hereinafter HARARE COLLOQUIUM] (both citing cases from Common-
wealth countries in which judges have incorporated international human
rights standards in domestic courts).
120. Muhammed Haleem, The Domestic Application of International
Human Rights Norms, in BANGALORE COLLOQUIUM, supra note 119, at 91; Raj-
soomer Lallah, International Human Rights Norms, in HARARE COLLOQUIUM,
supra note 119, at 29.
121. The colloquium held from February 24 - 26, 1988, in Bangalore, India,
included Chief Justices from Zimbabwe and Pakistan, a Deputy Chief Justice
from Papua New Guinea, Justices from India, Australia, Mauritius, and Sri
Lanka, a judge from the United States, and representatives of the United
Kingdom and Malaysia. BANGALORE COLLOQUIUM, supra note 119, at xi.
122. The attendees at the Colloquium held from April 19-22, 1989, in
Harare, Zimbabwe, included the Chief Justices of Zimbabwe, Gambia, Lesotho,
Botswana, Malawi, Kenya, Tanzania, the Seychelles, and Zambia, as well as
Justices from Nigeria, India, Zimbabwe, Australia, Mauritius, Ghana, and
Malawi and a Recorder, Queens Counsellor from the United Kingdom.
HARARE COLLOQUIUM, supra note 119, at 9.
123. Bangalore Principles, in BANGALORE COLLOQUIUM, supra note 119, ix,
x.
124. Harare Declaration of Human Rights, in HARARE COLLOQUIUM, supra
note 119, 9, 9.
125. See, e.g., Michael Kirby, The Role of the Judge in Advancing Human
Rights by Reference to Human Rights Norms, in BANGALORE COLLOQUIUM,
supra note 119, 67, 67.
126. Shridath S. Ramphal, Introduction by the Commonwealth Secretary-
General, in BANGALORE COLLOQUIUM, supra note 119, vii, vii; Shridath S.
Ramphal, Introduction by the Commonwealth Secretary-General to the First
Colloquium, in HARARE COLLOQUIUM, supra note 119, 7, 7.
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mon law.127 They also cite the need for education to ensure
that judges, lawyers, and litigants are aware of applicable
human rights standards. 2 8 The Harare Declaration noted re-
cent cases from the highest courts of Australia, India, Mauri-
tius, the United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe that have adopted
international norms.2 9
Several international human rights scholars and activists
have also pointed to domestic implementation as the preferred
long-term mechanism for enforcement of human rights
norms.'30 Such an approach implicitly relies on domestic ac-
ceptance of international standards. Acceptance may result
from participation in developing the norms or from the power
of moral suasion the standards attain in the international com-
munity. Proponents of domestic implementation argue that
"[t]he provision of local remedies is a key element in the imple-
mentation of rights. While the content of rights may be set at
the [international] level, individuals should be able to enjoy
them - and to ensure that enjoyment - locally.'' 1
A. UN=T Dow's CASE
An example of a successful case invoking international
standards and obligations to interpret a domestic constitution
and nationality law is Dow v. Attorney General of Botswana.13 2
127. Bangalore Principles, supra note 123, at x; Harare Declaration of
Human Rights, supra note 124, at 11.
128. Bangalore Principles, supra note 123, at 11; Harare Declaration of
Human Rights, supra note 124, at x.
129. Harare Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 124, at 11.
130. Rosalyn Higgins, Some Thoughts on the Implementation of Human
Rights, 89/1 BuLL. OF HUM. RTs. 60, 64-65 (1990); Opsahl, supra note 96, at 32
(noting that domestic implementation is central, because all violations occur
on the national level, and the secondary nature of international instruments
precludes their timely and effective involvement in individual cases); see also
Louis B. Sohn, Human Rights: Their Implementation and Supervision by the
United Nations, in 2 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND
PoLIcY IssuEs 369, 370 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984) (noting that most interna-
tional agreements rely on legislative enactments of States Parties for enforce-
ment); Byrnes, supra note 83, at 8 ("The ultimate criterion for success [for
CEDAW] is whether the process contributes to a greater awareness and obser-
vance of the human rights of women in domestic fora."); Freeman, supra note
39, passim (advocating use of women's human rights in domestic cases).
131. Higgins, supra note 130, at 64.
132. In re Dow v. Attorney Gen. of Bots., Case No. Misc. A. 124/90 (High
Ct. 1991). Since 1966, Botswana has been governed as a multiparty democracy
with the dual customary and common law legal system that characterizes
many African countries as a result of colonization. Stack, supra note 8, at
6.60.5-6 (summarizing history through period of British colonization); Athaliah
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Unity Dow, a Botswana lawyer, is married to Peter Nathan
Dow, a U.S. citizen.-an They have three children, all of whom
were born in Botswana where the family has resided continu-
ously.134 Under Botswana's amended Citizenship Act,:La the
two younger children, who were born after the marriage, were
denied Botswanan citizenship and are aliens in the land of their
birth.1 36 Unity Dow challenged the constitutionality of the dis-
criminatory provisions of the Citizenship Act by bringing suit
in the High Court of the Republic of Botswana in May 1990.137
In June 1991, the High Court ruled in her favor, 13 prompting
banner headlines in the national press reading "CONSTITU-
TION WRONG.' 39 In 1992, the Court of Appeal1 40 upheld the
Molokomme, Women's Law in Botswana, in THE LEGAL SITuATIoN OF WO-
MEN IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (2 WOMEN AND LAW IN SOUTHERN AFRICA) 7, 8 (Ju-
lie Stewart & Alice Armstrong eds., 1990). During the colonial period, the law
applicable to non-Africans was Roman-Dutch law received from what is now
part of South Africa. Id- at 9. Africans were subject to what is now called
"customary law," the traditional laws and practices of the various peoples who
inhabited the area. Id. at 8-9. See generally Athaliah Molokomme, Botswana:
Women and Customary Law, in EMPowm :ENT AND THE LAW: STRATEGIES
OF THIRD WORLD WOMEN 116, 117-19 (Margaret Schuler ed., 1986) (summariz-
ing evolution of customary law in Botswana). This dual legal system was re-
tained in Botswana after independence in 1966. Molokomme, Women's Law
in Botswana, supra, at 10. In the dual court system, customary and common
law courts exist in tandem in a single hierarchy. Id. at 11.
133. Applicant's Affidavit, supra note 2, 7.
134. 1& at 1 8-10.
135. See supra note 13 (1984 amendments provided that a child born in
Botswana would be a citizen of Botswana if the father is a citizen, or, in the
case of a child born out of wedlock, if the mother is a citizen).
136. The children's status as aliens means that they must receive residency
permits which they can obtain only as part of their father's permit. Botswana
grants these permits for no more than two years and only if the father is able
to remain in the country. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. In Dow,
the Court of Appeal noted that "for some time, at least, two of [Dow's] three
children had no more than three months granted each time for their stay in
Botswana." In re Attorney Gen. v. Dow, Court of Appeal No. 4/91 (Ct. App.
1992) (Bots.), at 63. The children may not travel outside of Botswana except
on their father's passport; thus they cannot leave or return to Botswana with
their mother alone. As aliens, the children are not eligible for government-
sponsored financial assistance for a University education which is available to
citizens. Applicant's Argument (Oct. 23, 1990), supra note 6, at 11 12-13. Es-
sentially, the children are denied the civil and political rights of citizens. See
supra text accompanying notes 6-10.
137. Applicant's Affidavit, supra note 2, 11 13, 15, 17, 19, 20, 22.
138. In re Dow v. Attorney Gen. of Bots., Case No. Misc. A 124/90 (High
Ct. 1991) (Bots.).
139. Keto Segwai, Constitution Wrong, THE REPORTER, June 14-20, 1991, at
1. Other newspapers ran similar headlines indicating the publicity surround-
ing the case. See, e.g., Joel Sebonego, A Woman Takes On the Government,
THE BOTSWANA GAZETTE, July 11, 1991; Ernest Moloi, Historic Verdict for
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decision with one modification.141
An analysis of Dow's arguments, the government's re-
sponse-both before the court and in private communications-
and the judgment, demonstrates the benefits she and other po-
tential plaintiffs gained from invoking international standards.
Dow claimed that the Citizenship Act of 1984 violated provi-
sions of the Constitution of Botswana guaranteeing liberty,' 42
equal protection of the law,143 immunity from expulsion,144 and
Dow, THE BOTSWANA GUARDIAN, June 14, 1991, at 1; Dow Judgment Causes
Crisis, THE BOTSWANA GAZETTE, June 19, 1991, at 1; Douglas Tsiako, A Victory
for Women's Rights, NEWSLINK AFRICA, June 14, 1991, at 1 (Bots.).
140. The Court of Appeal, Botswana's highest court, hears appeals from
the High Court, holding sessions only when necessary. Stack, supra note 8, at
6.60.9.
141. In re Attorney Gen. v. Dow, Court of Appeal No. 4/91 (Ct. App. 1992)
(Bots.) (3-2 decision). The ruling below held that both section 4 of the Citizen-
ship Act of 1984, applicable to children born in Botswana, and section 5, appli-
cable to children born outside of Botswana, were ultra vires of the
Constitution. While upholding the decision, the Court of Appeal confined its
decision to section 4, striking the reference to section 5. Id. at 65-66. See infra
notes 173-174 (summarizing the Court of Appeal opinions).
142. Applicant's Argument (Oct. 23, 1990), supra note 6, 3.1. Section 3 of
the Botswana Constitution provides that "Whereas every person in Botswana
is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to
say, the right, whatever his [or her] ... sex... [to] "(a) life, liberty, security of
the person and the protection of the law." BOTS. CoNsT. ch. H, § 3, reprinted
in Patricia E. Larkin et al., Botswana, in 2 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES
OF THE WORLD § 3, at 19 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1989)
[hereinafter CONSTITUTIONS].
Dow argued that the right to liberty guaranteed by Section 3 of the Con-
stitution includes the right to marry freely and found a family. Applicant's
Argument (Oct. 23, 1990), supra note 6, 10.1. She maintained that the Citi-
zenship Act violated this liberty interest by not securing the right of residence
of children born to Batswana women who are married to aliens. 1I 11. Nat-
uralization in Botswana generally requires 10 years of residency. Citizenship
Act, No. 25 of 1982, § 11 (Bots.). The amendments, however, allow for the nat-
uralization of alien wives of Batswana men upon application after two and
one-half years of residency. Citizenship (Amendment) Act, No. 17 of 1984, § 6
(Bots.). Because this provision does not apply to alien husbands of Batswana
women, Peter Dow's residency status and, therefore, the residency status of
Peter and Unity's two younger children, is contingent upon the government's
willingness to continue granting them residency permits. Dow argued that
these provisions affected her freedom to marry and found a family with the
man of her choice, violating her constitutional right to liberty. Applicant's Ar-
gument (Oct. 23, 1990), supra note 6, 1 8, 10-11. A male Botswana never suf-
fers this deleterious consequence because he automatically passes his
citizenship to his children, irrespective of his wife's nationality. 1I
143. Applicant's Argument (Oct. 23, 1990), supra note 6, % 3.2. See BOTs.
CONST. ch. II, § 15, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 31 ("Sub-
ject to the provisions of subsections (4), (5) and (7) of this section, no law shall
make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect.").
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the right to be free from degrading treatment. 145 Dow invoked
international standards to support each of her claims, 46 citing
international human rights standards and the specific interna-
144. Applicant's Argument (Oct. 23, 1990), supra note 6, % 3.2. See BOTS.
CONST. ch. II, § 14(1).
145. Applicant's Argument (Oct. 23, 1990), supra note 6, 3.4. See BOTs.
CONST. ch. H, § 7 ("No person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading punishment or other treatment.").
146. To substantiate her claim that the Act violated her right to liberty,
Dow cited two international human rights cases. She first cited Aumeeruddy-
Cziffra v. Mauritius. Appellant's Argument (Oct. 23, 1990), supra note 6, at I
10.1. In Aumeeruddy-Criffra, the U.N. Human Rights Committee found that
inequality in residency rights, based only upon the gender of foreign spouses,
violated the right to freedom from interference in family life. See supra notes
73-82 and accompanying text. The Committee found this interference unjusti-
fied even on grounds of national security. See supra note 82 and accompanying
text. Dow also cited the Abdulaziz Cabales decision of the European Court of
Human Rights. Appellant's Argument (Oct. 23, 1990), supra note 6, 110.3. See
supra note 108 (noting that in Abduaziz Cabales the Court found that the
practical exclusion of applicants' husbands and acceptance of applicants' wives
entailed sex discrimination with respect to family life).
To buttress her interpretation of Botswana's equal protection provision,
Dow cited interpretations of similar provisions in other countries' constitu-
tions, Appellant's Argument (Oct. 23, 1990), supra note 6, % 7, equal protection
clauses in international human rights instruments, id. % 9, and definitions from
the Women's Convention. Id. 12.3 (citing art. 9(2) of the Women's Conven-
tion). Dow based her constitutional argument upon the guarantee of protec-
tion of the laws irrespective of sex found in Section 3 of Botswana's
Constitution. Applicant's Argument (July 12,1990) % 5, In re Dow v. Attorney
Gen. of Bots., Case No. Misc. A 124/90 (High Ct. 1991) (Bots.) [hereinafter Ap-
plicant's Argument (July 12, 1990)]. Dow also cited the constitutions of the
United States, India, and Mauritius, which have equal protection provisions in-
terpreted to prohibit gender discrimination. Applicant's Argument (Oct. 23,
1990), supra note 6, % 9. She further submitted that equal protection clauses
are found in international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
American Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter on Human
and People's Rights. Id. To justify her reference to these international instru-
ments, Dow quoted Botswana caselaw noting that "recognition of fundamental
human rights has started to take on the garb of international customary law
amongst civilised democratic states of the world." Id. 44 4, 9 (citing Clover Pe-
trus, Criminal Appeal No. 34 (1983) (Bots.)).
Dow next invoked Botswana's status as a party to the African Charter to
establish Botswana's duty to grant her equal protection under its law. Id 44
12.1-12.3. Dow noted that the African Charter requires that the state "ensure
the elimination of every discrimination against women and also ensure the
protection of the rights of the women and the child as stipulated in interna-
tional declarations and conventions." Id. 12.1 (emphasis added) (citing Arti-
cle 18 of the African Charter). Dow then quoted the right to non-
discrimination with respect to nationality in the Women's Convention as an
obligation Botswana has undertaken by virtue of its ratification of the African
Charter, although Botswana has not ratified the Women's Convention. Id. %
12.3 (citing Article 9). Dow also cited the Human Rights Committee decision
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tional obligations of Botswana as guidelines for interpreting the
substance of these domestic constitutional provisions.1-47 Dow
asserted that because the Constitution purported to protect
human rights and prohibit discrimination, the Court must con-
strue its meaning in light of Botswana's membership in the
United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, and Bot-
swana's status as a party to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights.14
The Attorney General of Botswana rejected the interna-
tional aspects of Dow's argument.149 The government took the
position that international treaties become part of the law in
Botswana only when incorporated by legislation.150 The gov-
ernment stated that "at most they are an interpretive aid when
the meaning of a local statute is unclear," but then submitted
that the United Nations Charter and the African Charter were
in Lovelace. Id. 1 12.3. See supra note 72 (discussing gender discrimination in
Canadian Indian Act at issue in Lovelace).
In support of the argument that the discrimination Dow suffered consti-
tuted degrading treatment, Dow employed language from the Declaration on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women describing discrimination as
"an offence against human dignity." Applicant's Argument (Oct. 23, 1990),
supra note 6, % 13.2. She quoted the Declaration, rather than the Convention
because Botswana participated in the adoption of the Declaration, but has not
ratified the Convention. Dow argued that "degrading treatment" includes not
only physical acts but any interference with a person's dignity. Id 113.5.
Dow also invoked customary international law protecting the right to set-
tle and reside in the territory of one's state of nationality, id. T 9, and the cor-
responding duty of the state to grant residence to its nationals to support her
claim to a violation of her constitutional right to immunity from expulsion. Id.
IT 13.6. The Citizenship Act, according to Dow, presumes that a Botswana wo-
man who marries a foreigner "wishes, intends or is able to emigrate to the
country of her husband's origin." Id. She argued that unless her children are
citizens, her right to reside in Botswana and her immunity from expulsion
"are meaningless." Id Should her husband leave the country, she contended,
she would be obligated to follow him to preserve her children's citizenship.
See id. I 10.1-10.2. If he left her and the children, the children would lose
their right to residency in Botswana. Id. I 11.1-11.3.
147. Dow also referred to decisions of courts in other commonwealth coun-
tries and to United States Supreme Court decisions. See supra note 146. Inter-
national bodies also have cited United States Supreme Court decisions for
principles of interpretation of fundamental rights. See, e.g., Anthony Lester,
Freedom of Expression, in BANGALORE COLLOQUIUM, supra note 119, at 27-28
(noting that the European Court of Human Rights relied upon Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)).
148. Applicant's Argument (July 12, 1990), supra note 146, 1T 10, 11.
149. Respondent's Heads of Argument, In re Dow v. Attorney Gen. of
Bots., Case No. Misc. A 124/90, % B.14.1-14.4 (High Ct. 1991) [hereinafter Re-
spondent's Argument].
150. Id. 14.1. See supra notes 116-118 (discussing the application of inter-
national treaties in domestic cases).
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not of assistance in the case.1 51 The government also claimed
that Unity Dow had no standing, 5 2 that the drafters of the
Constitution of Botswana did not intend to guarantee freedom
from sex discrimination,' s5 and that she herself had not exper-
ienced any effects due to the Citizenship Act.1'
The Botswana government's internal discussion during the
case differs substantially from its legal response and demon-
strates the effectiveness of Dow's strategy of invoking interna-
tional standards. Before filing its response with the High
Court, the Attorney General prepared a memorandum directed
to the Permanent Secretary to the President. 1-5 The memoran-
dum stated that the government would probably prevail in the
case, but "for technical reasons, and not because the Citizenship
Act is non-discriminatory."'1 It proceeded to describe "other
151. Respondent's Argument, supra note 149, $1 14.2-14.4.
152. The government raised the issue of standing as a threshold argument.
Id 1 A-A.10. The government did not contest Dow's assertion that the Citi-
zenship Act affords different citizenship status to the children of Batswana
women as opposed to the children of Batswana men. Id- The Attorney Gen-
eral denied, however, that the Citizenship Act affected Unity Dow as it con-
cerned the acquisition of citizenship by her children. Id- I A.4. The Attorney
General asserted that the children, as minors, may litigate only through their
guardian. Id Under Botswana law, the father is the legal guardian of children
born to a married couple. See id The government maintained that Dow, as
the children's mother, has no legal standing to make a claim on their behalf.
I& A.1O. Furthermore, because "the right to pass citizenship" does not ap-
pear in the Constitution, the Attorney General denied that Dow had any claim
of her own. I&. % A.6.
153. The government challenged Dow's basic premise that the Constitution
prohibits gender discrimination. Id 11 B.6-B.11.5.1.1. Noting the omission of
sex as a basis of discrimination in the Constitution of Botswana, the Attorney
General maintained that the Constitution was never intended to prohibit sex
discrimination. Respondent's Argument, supra note 149, t B.11.9. See Bows.
CoNsT. ch. H, § 15(3), reprinted in 2 CONsTITUTIONS, supra note 142. Citing
the extensive sexual discrimination in the statutes, customary law, and com-
mon law of Botswana, the Attorney General argued that gender-neutrality
"could not have been the intention of the Constitution." Respondent's Argu-
ment, supra note 149, 1 B.11.6.
154. The Attorney General contended that Dow had experienced neither
degrading treatment nor the threat of expulsion. The government accepted
Dow's definition of "degrading treatment," id. I B.13.11.4, but denied that the
statute had "meted out" such treatment to her. Id. 1 A.7. The Attorney Gen-
eral also assessed her risk of expulsion without reference to her family mem-
bers, claiming that Dow did not suffer a threat of expulsion because she
herself is a national. Id- A.5.
155. Memorandum from I.S. Kirby, Attorney General's Chambers, to Per-
manent Secretary to the President of Botswana (August 16, 1990) (on file with
the Minnesota Law Review).
156. Id §7.
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factors that make the matter significant,' 57 particularly that
the Dow case highlighted Botswana's failure to sign the Wo-
men's Convention.'158 The Attorney General acknowledged
Botswana's general policy prohibiting discrimination against
women consistent with the fundamental rights provisions of
the Constitution,159 but stated that "practice (and indeed the
law) falls far short of achieving that ideal."'i 6 Weighing the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of signing the Women's Conven-
tion,16' the Attorney General advocated signing, noting that
signing "would provide an answer of substance to the adverse
comment that is sure to arise from the case."'6 2
The High Court judgment also reflects the success of Dow's
strategy of highlighting Botswana's international obligations. 63
When confronted with two plausible constitutional interpreta-
tions, the judge cited these obligations as requiring an interpre-
tation consistent with the treaties and with case law from other
Commonwealth jurisdictions.1i 4 The judge concluded that Dow
suffered adverse consequences which denied her fundamental
rights on the basis of her sex.i 65 He found that the effect of the
Citizenship Act was to "unnecessarily hamper free choice, the
liberty of the subject to exercise her rights in terms of the Con-
stitution in the way she sees fit.' 66 In holding for Dow on the
claim of degrading treatment, he referred to the definition of
discrimination in the Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women 6 7 that Dow cited as
proof of an evolving standard of the nature of degrading
treatment i 68
157. Id. § 8 (including media attention at home and abroad, an amicus brief
submitted to the court by a human rights institute in the U.S., and a World
Bank Financial Report noting married women's lack of capacity to contract in
Botswana).
158. Id.
159. Id. § 10.
160. Id.
161. Id. §§ 10-17.
162. Id § 18.
163. See In re Dow v. Attorney Gen. of Bots., Case No. Misc. A. 124/90
(High Ct. 1991).
164. Id. at 18-20.
165. Id. at 13-14 (rejecting the government's standing argument, and detail-
ing the deleterious consequences suffered by the plaintiff, but not by a male in
similar circumstances).
166. Id at 15.
167. Id. at 23. Unlike a Convention, a Declaration does not require ratifica-
tion. While not ratifying the Convention, Botswana participated in the adop-
tion of the Declaration. See supra note 146.
168. See supra notes 145, 146.
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Concerning the central question of whether the Botswana
Constitution mandates equal protection of the law for men and
women, the judge again relied on international standards. A
ruling excluding gender from the equal protection provision of
the Constitution, he wrote, would not be consistent with the
guarantee of equal protection of the law found in the funda-
mental rights provision.' 69 The judge considered his view
strengthened by Botswana's status as State Party to the African
Charter of Human And Peoples' Rights, 70 even though he ac-
knowledged that the convention did not compel the ruling.'7 '
In holding that the equal protection clause included gender dis-
crimination, however, he construed the Constitution so as not
to "do violence to the language" of the Convention. 72
The Court of Appeal's decision in the Dow case also in-
cludes extensive discussion of the proper application of interna-
tional standards and obligations in Botswana's domestic courts.
The three decisions that comprise the majority cite Dow's and
the High Court Judge's use of international norms.173 The two
169. In re Dow, Case No. Misc. A 124/90, at 17-18 (concluding that refer-
ence to contemporary standards of sexual equality to interpret the Constitu-
tion would not violate nor exceed his judicial function).
170. IM at 18 (mistakenly referring to the Organization of African Unity
Convention on Non-Discrimination).
171. I&
172. Id-
173. Judge Amissah, writing the majority opinion, noted that although mu-
nicipal law governs citizenship, whatever basis the legislature chooses for citi-
zenship, that law must do so with "two pre-requisites: it must, in the first
place, conform to the constitution of the state in question, and secondly it
must conform to international law." In re Attorney Gen. v. Dow, Court of Ap-
peal No. 4/91, at 29 (Ct. App. 1992). Rejecting the Attorney General's opposi-
tion to the use of international norms, the judge wrote that they may be used
as an interpretive aid when constitutional provisions are unclear, as they were
in this case. Id. He further stated that at the time that the Constitution was
adopted, Botswana was "[entering] the comity of nations," and thus interna-
tional standards existing at that time, including the International Declaration
of Human Rights, informed the approach of the framers of Botswana's Consti-
tution. Id He then cited Botswana's status as a signatory to the African Char-
ter, cited the Charter provisions prohibiting sex discrimination and
guaranteeing freedom of movement, id. at 52, and concluded that "it would be
wrong for [Botswana's] Courts to interpret its legislation in a manner which
conflicts with the international obligations Botswana has undertaken." Id. at
52-54. He also quoted with approval the High Court judge's reference to con-
temporary standards in order to interpret the Constitution. Id. at 53. See
supra note 169.
Judge Aguda, concurring, engaged in a more extensive analysis of the use
of international norms in the case. He stated that Botswana could not afford
to insulate itself from international sources of law and the opinions of judges
in other jurisdictions. Id at 80. He noted with approval the conclusions of the
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dissenting opinions, however, express disapproval of this aspect
of the majority decision.174
B. LESSONS FROM UNITY Dow's CASE
Women clearly need alternative methods of using interna-
tional law to challenge discriminatory nationality provisions.
Strengthening the implementation mechanisms of the Women's
Convention and increasing the resources provided to CEDAW
would improve international options for women challenging
discriminatory laws. Perhaps the most accessible option, how-
ever, as illustrated by the successful case of Dow, is the in-
creased use of international standards in domestic courts to
inform and interpret domestic law.175 Although women may
face significant impediments in gaining access to domestic
courts, 176 a domestic case may proceed more quickly and offer
better enforcement mechanisms than a complaint before an in-
Bangalore Colloquium, observing that Commonwealth judges are expressing
the opinion that they are obligated to ensure that domestic laws within their
countries conform to their countries' international obligations. Id. at 81-82.
In applying these principles to the Dow case, the judge cites Arts. 2 and 9
of the Women's Convention, id, at 82-83, the Organization of African Unity, i.
at 83, and Botswana's ratification of the African Charter, i., which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex in Article 2 and provides for equal protec-
tion of the law in Article 3. Id, at 84. Judge Aguda states that international
instruments may serve as aids to interpretation, even if not ratified, when
"such international convention agreement, treaty, protocol etc. purports to or
by necessary implication, creates an international regime within international
law recognised by the vast majority of States." Id. at 85. He concluded that
there is a clear obligation on all signatories to the Charter to eliminate dis-
crimination against women, and that courts must interpret domestic statutory
law so as to be compatible with international law. Id, at 86-87.
174. Id. at 127-28 (Schreiner, J., dissenting) (noting that international
agreements prohibiting sexual discrimination, even those to which Botswana
was a party, do not require "the alteration of the meaning of section 15 (3) by
the insertion of words which are not there"); i. at 140-41 (Puckrin, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that permitting reference to extraneous interpretive aids such as
international law where the Constitution is unambiguous would abdicate the
sovereignty that the Constitution was designed to protect).
175. See supra notes 132-174 and accompanying text (discussing successful
use of international law in Dow). But see Alan Goldfarb, A Kenyan Wife's
Right to Bury Her Husband Applying the Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 14 I SA J. INT'L L. 1, 12-20
(1990) (unsuccessful use of international law in domestic case).
176. Marsha A. Freeman, Measuring Equality: A Comparative Perspective
on Women's Legal Capacity and Constitutional Rights in Five Commonwealth
Countries, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J. 110, 111 n.3 (1990). See generally EM-
POWERMENT AND THE LAW: STRATEGIES OF TimRD WORLD WOMEN (Margaret
Schuler ed., 1986); LEGAL LrrERACY: A TOOL FOR WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT
(Margaret Schuler & Sakuntala Kadirgamar-Rajasingham eds., 1992).
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ternational forum. A complainant in a domestic court may in-
voke provisions from treaties such as the Women's Convention
which have the most helpful standards, but do not have effec-
tive independent international implementation mechanisms ap-
plicable to individual cases.177  Under international law
countries that have signed, but not ratified, a treaty may not act
in contravention to the goals of the treaty;7 8 thus, complain-
ants may invoke provisions from these treaties in the courts of
signatories who are not legally bound by implementation mech-
anisms.17 9 A domestic court may have greater power to enforce
a favorable decision and its judgment will likely enjoy greater
domestic legitimacy than the decision of an international body.
The process of invoking international standards in domestic
courts also provides an educational benefit, and may lead to
pressure on a government to ratify international human rights
treaties 8 0
Women bringing such cases must anticipate arguments like
those of the government of Botswana in the Dow case, particu-
larly those opposing the concept that international standards
may inform domestic law.' 8 ' Yet the process of bringing these
cases focuses increased attention on discrimination against wo-
men and highlights individual countries' obligations toward wo-
men under international law. The Bangalore Principles and
the Harare Declaration'8 2 as well as the judgment in Dow's
case indicate that some courts are receptive to these arguments.
177. Due to the large number of nations party to the Women's Convention,
the argument that the country has pledged to conform its laws to progressively
implement the treaty standards is available in many countries. FRASER & KA-
ZANTsIs, supra note 100, at 36-41.
178. Vienna Convention, supra note 53, art. 18. The United States, for ex-
ample, has signed but not ratified the Women's Convention. MULTILATERAL
TREATIES, supra note 35, at 170; MERoN, supra note 46, at 53-54.
179. See Vienna Convention, supra note 53, art. 18; see also Cook, supra
note 32, at 648 (analyzing the application of the Vienna Convention to the Wo-
men's Convention, particularly in the context of a state's duty not to reserve
in contravention of the purpose of a treaty).
180. See supra notes 155-162 and accompanying text (noting that Unity
Dow's case publicized the fact that Botswana is not party to the Women's Con-
vention, and that the press reported the Attorney General's memorandum rec-
ommending ratification of the Women's Convention to counteract negative
publicity generated by Dow).
181. See supra notes 119-31 and accompanying text (discussing the signifi-
cance of the legal status of international obligations in domestic courts).
182. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text (discussing the domes-
tic application of international human rights standards in domestic courts).
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CONCLUSION
Women in many countries face discriminatory nationality
laws. Several sources of international law prohibit such dis-
crimination. Although customary international law fails to pro-
vide an explicit prohibition against such discrimination, it forms
a continuously evolving body of law which may arguably pro-
hibit sex discrimination in nationality laws as nationality be-
comes more widely accepted as a human right and the principle
of nondiscrimination on the basis of sex gains international ac-
ceptance. Treaty-based law and the implementation mecha-
nisms of international human rights treaties provide a second
source. The Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights appear receptive to cases challenging
discriminatory nationality laws. The requirements for bringing
a case in an international forum and the weak implementation
mechanisms of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, however, present significant
drawbacks. Finally, women may invoke international standards
to inform domestic law. Bringing a domestic case may present
the best option in appropriate cases. This approach has the ad-
vantages of being more accessible, of highlighting a country's
international obligations and making more women aware of
their rights, of greater enforceability and domestic acceptance,
and of establishing a body of precedent that women of other
countries and international bodies may use.
The current movement is toward limitations on state sover-
eignty over nationality laws and greater acceptance of national-
ity as a fundamental right. This movement must be viewed in
light of the developing international principle of non-discrimi-
nation. Together, these trends imply that states may not con-
tinue to discriminate on the basis of gender in their citizenship
and nationality laws.
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APPENDIX
The following summary of Reports is not an exhaustive collection of coun-
tries which discriminate; the list includes only those countries which have sub-
mitted reports to CEDAW reflecting an admission of noncompliance with
Article 9 of the Women's Convention.
As a source of documentation of individual countries' nationality laws,
these reports have several weaknesses. Parties submitting reports may de-
scribe their nationality laws selectively or inaccurately. Reports may contain
conclusory statements and often fail to include citations to the country's laws
which would allow independent verification of the assertions in the reports.
See Byrnes, supra note 83, at 14. Reports indicating that the country is not in
compliance with Article 9, however, are likely to be reliable. Having ratified
or acceded to the Women's Convention and having prepared a report on its im-
plementation, a State Party likely wants CEDAW to view it in the best possi-
ble light. It is doubtful that a party to the Convention would intentionally
represent its laws as violative of the Convention.
The recommended structure for these reports includes a section describ-
ing the country's efforts to implement each article of the Convention. See
General guidelines regarding the form and content of reports received from
States Parties under Article 18 of the Convention, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/7
(1983), reprinted in Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimi-
nation Against Women, Sixth Session, 42 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 38, U.N. Doc.
A/42/38 (1987). See generally INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S RIGHTS ACTION
WATCH, ASSESSING THE STATUS OF WOMEN: A GUIDE TO REPORTING USING
THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FoRMs OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN (1988).
In the Dominican Republic, Article 11, § 4, para. 3, of the Constitution al-
lows a man to confer his nationality on his foreign wife, but does not provide
this capacity to women. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, Initial Reports of States Parties: Dominican Republic, at 16,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/5/Add.61 (1987). Thus the Dominican Republic would
require a foreign husband to comply with naturalization procedures to acquire
Dominican nationality. In the case of naturalized Dominicans, the State grants
citizenship to the unmarried children under 18 years of age of a naturalized
male, but not to such children of a naturalized woman unless she is unmarried
or has custody of the children. I&L at 16. In its report to CEDAW, the Domini-
can Republic indicated that this discrimination in naturalization provisions vio-
lated the coexisting law establishing shared authority of mothers and fathers
for their children. IML The report indicates that this provision "will have to be
modified in order to bring it into harmony with the principles of equality that
currently prevail." Id
Egypt's laws grant a woman the right to pass her Egyptian nationality to
her children only if her husband is of unknown nationality or stateless, or if
the father is not legally determined. A child born abroad to an Egyptian
mother and an unknown or stateless father may choose Egyptian citizenship
within one year of reaching majority. Committee on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination Against Women, Initial Reports of States Parties: Arab Republic
of Egypt, at 3-4, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/5/Add.10/Amend.1 (1984).
Ghana states in its report that "[t]here are provisions for women to ac-
quire citizenship by marriage to a Ghanaian male." Committee on the Elimina-
tion of Discrimination Against Women, Initial, second and third periodic
reports of States parties: Ghana, at 13, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GHA/1-3 (1991)
(emphasis added). It further states, "[t]he Nationality Act makes no direct
provision for a man married to a Ghanaian woman to be registered as a citi-
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zen." Id, The report states that the suspended 1979 constitution allowed a
man married monogamously to a Ghanaian woman for a continuous period of
at least five years while permanently residing in Ghana to apply to be regis-
tered as a citizen. I& Although the report indicates that this constitution was
suspended at the time of the report, it noted that this provision "Was suppos-
edly to protect Ghanaian women from foreigners marrying them in order to
take advantage of liberal citizenship laws, [although] it merely served to rein-
force the image of women as being incapable of looking after themselves." I&
The current law is discriminatory insofar as it allows foreign wives but not for-
eign husbands to register as citizens.
Iraq's report states that its nationality law is "based on general principles,
foremost among which are the maintenance of the one-nationality family, non-
duality of nationality and non-loss of nationality by any of the family mem-
bers." Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
Initial Reports of States Parties: Iraq, at 14-15, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/5/Add.66/Rev.1 (1990). Iraqi law, as described in its report to
CEDAW, provides for the acquisition of Iraqi nationality by a foreign woman
who is a citizen of Iraq and married to an Iraqi male upon approval of the Min-
ister of the Interior. Id. The requirements are more stringent if the foreign
wife is non-Arab. Furthermore, Iraqi law states that a "foreign woman [who is
not a citizen of Iraq, but is] married to an Iraqi may not acquire her husband's
nationality according to [the application upon marriage provisions]; moreover,
a foreign woman married to a foreign national may not acquire Iraqi national-
ity alone." I& at 15. Regarding children, minor children of foreign nationals
acquire Iraqi nationality upon such acquisition by their father. Minor children
also lose Iraqi nationality if their father loses his Iraqi nationality. Id.
Jamaica states in its report that "there is regretably [sic] a difference be-
tween existing Jamaican laws and the objective of paragraph 2 [of Article 9 of
the Women's Convention]." Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, Initial Reports of States Parties: Jamaica, at 14, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/5/Add.38 (1986). The Jamaican Constitution provides that "a per-
son born outside Jamaica after the 5th day of August 1962 shall become a citi-
zen of Jamaica at the date of his birth if at that date his father is a citizen of
Jamaica." I& The report further indicates that the existence of this incompat-
ibility with the Women's Convention motivated Jamaica's reservation to Art. 9
of the Convention. I& The report states that the reservation will be with-
drawn once legislation is enacted to conform with Art. 9, 2. Id. As of July
31, 1992, Jamaica's reservation was still in effect. MULTILATERAL TREATIES,
supra note 35, at 169-83.
Kenya's report also states that its laws relating to citizenship and national-
ity "are not yet in conformity with the convention as far as the nationality of
the children is concerned." Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, Initial and second periodic reports of States Parties: Kenya,
at 6, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/KEN/1-2 (1991). Acquisition of citizenship by de-
scent is granted only through the father unless the child is born to a single
mother. Id
Madagascar grants Malagasy nationality to children of Malagasy fathers
only. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Initial
Reports of States Parties: Madagascar, at 13-14, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/5/Add.65/Rev.1 (1991). The mother passes her nationality to her
children only if the father is unknown or stateless. Id Madagascar's report
indicates that children of a Malagasy mother and a foreign father may claim
the mother's nationality until they reach majority. Id-
In its initial report, under the subtitle Political Rights, Nigeria stated, "Ni-
geria is a patriarchal society, perhaps more male-oriented than is normally ap-
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preciated by western observers." Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, Initial Reports of States Parties: Nigeria, at
36, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/5/Add.49 (1987). Under Nigerian law, an alien wo-
man married to a Nigerian man may apply for and obtain Nigerian citizenship,
but an alien man married to a Nigerian woman does not have this right. Com-
mittee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Initial Reports
of States Parties: Nigeria, at 16, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/5/Add.49/Amend.1
(1987).
The Philippines' report states that the 1987 Constitution completely re-
moved discriminatory provisions imposed on women marrying aliens. Com-
mittee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Second Periodic
Reports of States Parties: Philippines, at 77-78, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/13/Add.17 (1989). However, it also indicates that if an alien wo-
man marries a Filipino man, she automatically becomes a Filipina. ML The
same occurs if a foreign woman's husband acquires Filipino citizenship after
marriage. IM
Under the law of Rwanda, "the man is the sole donor of Rwandese nation-
ality." Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Sec-
ond Periodic Reports of States Parties: Rwanda, at 9-10, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/13/Add.13 (1988). A Rwandese woman may transmit her national-
ity to her children only if the father is unknown or stateless. Id. Rwandese
law also discriminates in naturalization upon marriage. A Rwandese man who
marries a foreigner may transmit his nationality to his spouse, but a woman
who marries a foreigner may not. Id.
Senegal maintains unequal provisions for the naturalization of foreign
spouses. Male spouses must maintain a 5-year period of residence before ac-
quiring Senegalese nationality, while female spouses automatically acquire
Senegalese nationality unless the woman renounces it. Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Second Periodic Reports of
States Parties: Senegal, at 7-8, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SEN/2 (1991). Like
many reports, the Senegalese report does not indicate whether the country's
laws conform to Article 9(2) of the Women's Convention regarding the nation-
ality of children. See . at 7-8.
Sri Lanka's initial report states that the country does not discriminate
with regard to citizenship on the ground of sex. Committee on the Elimina-
tion of Discrimination Against Women, Initial Reports of States Parties: Sri
Lanka, at 8, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/5/Add.29 (1985). The report continues,
however, by noting that "there are several races [in Sri Lanka] and the wife is
treated as of the race of her husband for certain purposes." Id. The Report
states that a wife acquires "the rank and dignity" of her husband as well as his
domicile, but not his citizenship unless she opts to do so. Id- Sri Lanka indi-
cates in its Second Periodic Report, however, that within marriage the father's
citizenship determines acquisition of citizenship by descent. Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Initial Reports of States Par-
ties: Sri Lanka, at 12, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/13/Add.18 (1989).
Tanzania's provisions for naturalization upon marriage discriminate on
the basis of sex. A foreign woman who marries a Tanzanian man is automati-
cally entitled to citizenship, but a foreign man cannot gain citizenship through
marriage to a Tanzanian woman. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimi-
nation Against Women, Initial Reports of States Parties: Tanzania, at 122-123,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/5/Add.57/Amend.1 (1989). Tanzanian women enjoy
more liberal rights to reacquire citizenship after renouncing it. Id at 122.
Thai law also favors acquisition of the Thai nationality by foreign women
marrying Thai men but not by foreign men marrying Thai women. Thailand
ratified the Women's Convention with a reservation to Art. 9(2) because a 1972
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Executive Order, motivated by "fears of illegal immigrants and refugees," re-
scinded a Thai woman's right to pass her nationality to her children if she
marries an illegal alien or a man with temporary permission to reside in Thai-
land. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Initial
Reports of States Parties: Thailand, at 20-21, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/5/Add.51
(1987).
The United Kingdom reserved from the nationality provisions of the Wo-
men's Convention, stating that although the British Nationality Act of 1981 re-
flects the principle of equal rights for men and women regarding the
acquisition, change, or retention of nationality, the United Kingdom also in-
tends to retain "temporary and transitional provisions" extending certain
rights conferred under previous nationality law which treat men and women
differently. MULTIATERAL TREATIES, supra note 35, at 176. The most recent
report of the United Kingdom to CEDAW reveals that several of these provi-
sions remain in effect. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, Second Periodic Reports of States Parties: United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, at 50-51, U.N. Doec. CEDAW/C/UK/2
(1991). The United Kingdom's report provides a good example of a report un-
deremphasizing the discriminatory aspects of its laws. For an analysis of the
discriminatory provisions of the British Nationality Act of 1981 and its corre-
sponding immigration regulations, see Mullen, supra note 66, at 146.
Yemen's law grants nationality to foreign wives of Yemeni men after a
domicile of two years. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, Initial Reports of States Parties: Democratic Yemen, at 12,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/5/Add.61 (1989).
As more countries ratify or accede to the Women's Convention, report to
CEDAW on their implementation efforts and change their nationality laws to
comply with the treaty, they frequently extend rights to women previously
granted only to men. In some cases, however, where the discrimination may
be perceived as favorable to women, such as a favorable naturalization provi-
sion upon marriage to a national, the country may eliminate the more
favorable provision rather than extend it to men. See, e.g., Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Initial and Second Periodic Re-
ports of States Parties: Zambia, at 5, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/5/ZAM/1-2 (1991)
(indicating that Article 8 (b) of the Zambia Constitution has been replaced so
that both men and women may apply for citizenship only after 10 years of resi-
dence in Zambia). This change eliminated a favorable naturalization provision
for wives rather than extend it to husbands. The Constitution of Zambia Act
of 1991 retains the favorable provision for women married for the required
three-year period prior to July 24, 1988. ZAMBIA CONST. (Constitution of
Zambia Act, 1991), pt. II (Citizenship), § 6.
On a more positive note, some countries that have changed their laws to
eliminate discrimination have also taken steps to ameliorate the effects of past
discrimination by applying the new provisions retroactively. See, e.g., Commit-
tee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Second Periodic Re-
ports of States Parties: Philippines, at 77-78, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/13/Add.17
(1989) (making the change partially retroactive by deeming persons born
before [the right to pass nationality was extended to mothers] who elect Filip-
pine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, natural-born citizens);
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Initial Re-
ports of States Parties: New Zealand, at 52, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/5/Add.41
(1987) (citing a provision remedying past discrimination by granting a right to
application for citizenship to persons born outside of New Zealand to a mother
with New Zealand citizenship). But see Irene R. Cortes, Women's Rights
Under the 1973 Constitution, 50 PHniPPINE L. J. 1, 9-10 (1975) (noting that the
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1973 Constitution removes some but not all discriminatory effects of Phillipine
nationality law).
A last factor regarding gender discrimination in nationality laws which de-
serves mention is the remaining discrimination against men in nationality
laws. In many countries, unlike women, men have no rights to pass their na-
tionality to children born outside of marriage. See; eg., Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Second Periodic Reports of
States Parties: Sweden, at 81, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/13/Add.6 (1987) (stating
that the child of a Swedish father who is not married to the mother of the
child obtains Swedish citizenship at birth only if the mother is Swedish). Such
discrimination is arguably prohibited by Art. 9(2) of the Women's Convention
which provides that countries shall grant women "equal rights with men" with
respect to the nationality of their children. Women's Convention, supra note
29, art. 9(2).

